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In	 this	 paper,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 'being	 good'	 positively	 correlates	 to	 'being	 happy.'	First,	I	will	clarify	how	I’ll	be	using	the	word	‘morality’	and	the	phrase	‘being	good’.	Second,	 I	 will	 claim	 that	moral	 goodness	 is	 developed	 and	 exercised	 as	 a	 kind	 of	practical	skill.	This	will	allow	me	to	propose	that	 ‘being	good’	–	like	other	complex	and	engaging	skills	–	entails	the	elicitation	of	a	kind	of	Jlow	experience.	Third,	I	will	propose	that	‘being	good’	involves	achieving	what	I'll	call	‘vertical	coherency’	within	one’s	 life	and	 that	 this	provides	 sustained	engagement	 (‘Jlow’)	and	meaning	while	exercising	moral	 goodness.	 Lastly,	 I	will	 show	why	 the	 kind	 of	 happiness	 that	we	truly	want	for	ourselves	and	those	we	care	about	emerges	from	a	moral	engagement	–	a	‘good	Jlow’	–	of	the	sort	described.		
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Part	1:	Introduction		 The	main	conclusion	of	my	paper	 is	the	following:	 ‘being	good’	positively	correlates	to	‘being	happy’.	If	you’re	a	sincerely	good	person,	you’re	more	likely	to	be	genuinely	happy;	if	you’re	genuinely	happy,	this	is	indicative	of	your	being	a	sincerely	good	person.			 I	acknowledge	the	unfortunately	common	circumstances	where	this	does	not	seem	to	be	the	case.	For	example,	when	a	good	person	is	unhappy	or	when	a	bad	person	is	happy.	Yet,	my	 position	 can	 accommodate	 most	 these	 ostensible	 counterexamples	 by	 insisting	 that	these	cases	don’t	exhibit	the	kind	of	goodness	or	happiness	that	we	truly	want	for	ourselves	or	those	we	care	about.	As	one	would	expect,	this	paper	will	be	providing	a	restricted	or	thin	account	of	 ‘morality’	 and	 ‘happiness’	 that	 I	will	 qualify	below	 (Part	2	 and	5	 respectively).	This	is	—	in	part	—	meant	to	lessen	the	notorious	ambiguity	that	is	present	with	these	two	terms	to	begin	with.	There	will	be	legitimate	counterexamples	(in	Part	4)	that	I	will	address	once	this	ambiguity	is	averted.		 In	 general,	 my	 approach	 is	 meant	 to	 avoid	 pedantry	 and	 to	 propose	 a	 realistic	 and	comprehensible	 way	 that	morality	 and	 happiness	 can	 be	 strongly	 related.	 I	 will	 not	 put-forward	a	moral	theory	of	my	own	but	I	hope	to	show	that	modern	psychology	and	careful	appeals	 to	 common	 sense	 reinforce	 my	 claim	 that	 moral	 goodness	 and	 happiness	 are	positively	correlated.	The	paper	 itself	makes	use	of	substantial	engagements	with	positive	psychology	 and	 cognitive	 science	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 empirical	 support	 for	 some	assumptions	that	I	may	have	left	untreated.		 Part	2	of	the	paper	will	clarify	how	I’ll	be	using	the	word	‘morality’	and	the	phrase	‘being	good’.	 In	 Part	 3,	 I	will	 claim	 that	moral	 goodness	 is	 developed	 and	 exercised	 as	 a	 kind	 of	practical	 skill.	 This	will	 allow	me	 to	 propose	 that	 ‘being	 good’	—	 like	 other	 complex	 and	engaging	skills	—	entails	the	elicitation	of	a	kind	of	Jlow	experience.	In	Part	4,	I	will	propose	that	 ‘being	good’	 involves	achieving	what	 I’ll	 call	 ‘vertical	 coherency’	within	one’s	 life	and	that	this	provides	sustained	engagement	and	meaning	while	exercising	moral	goodness.	The	convergence	of	engaging	Jlow	experience	and	meaning	is	called	‘vital	engagement’.	In	Part	5	and	6,	I	will	show	why	vital	engagement	of	this	sort	is	the	kind	of	happiness	that	we	truly	want	 for	 ourselves	 and	 those	we	 care	 about.	 Thus,	 I	 conclude	 that	 ‘being	 good’	 positively	correlates	to	‘being	happy’.			 The	 conception	 of	 happiness	 I	 discuss	 is	 adapted	 from	 L.W.	 Sumner’s	 notion	 of	happiness	presented	in	his	book	Welfare,	Happiness,	and	Ethics	(1996).	There,	he	concludes	
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that	‘being	happy’	“means	having	a	certain	kind	of	positive	attitude	toward	your	life,	which	in	 its	 fullest	 form	 has	 both	 a	 cognitive	 and	 an	 affective	 component”	 (pp.	 145-6).	 This	working	deJinition	of	happiness	might	be	helpful	to	keep	in	mind	as	my	argument	unfolds.	
Part	2:	Morality	&	Virtue		 In	 the	 interest	 of	 developing	 a	 plausible	 way	 of	 showing	 that	 ‘being	 good’	 positively	correlates	 to	 ‘being	 happy’,	 I	 start	 from	 a	 thin	 account	 of	 ‘being	 good’	 that,	 although	controversial	in	contemporary	philosophy,	is	nevertheless	widely	shared	by	people	past	and	present.	Although	 it	 goes	 beyond	 the	purview	of	 this	 paper	 to	 defend	 this	 thin	 account,	 I	think	it	counts	in	favor	of	my	view	that	the	view	is	widely	shared,	seen	not	just	in	historical	moral	 traditions	 (e.g.,	 Buddhist,	 Confucian,	 and	 ancient	 Greek	 traditions)	 but	 implicit	 in	moral	intuitions	of	many	people	today.	This	thin	account	puts	greater	emphasis	on	goodness	as	a	 state	of	 character	or	a	description	of	agents	 (what	 I	 term	 ‘being	good’)	 than	on	right	action	(what	I	term	‘doing	good’),	and	it	assumes	that	being	good	demands,	in	some	sense,	a	kind	 of	 sincere,	 wholehearted	 orientation	 toward	 the	 good,	 so	 that	 one’s	 cognitions,	conations	and	broader	ethical	commitments	are	aligned.	Some	might	recognize	this	account	as	 being	 among	 the	 core	 commitments	 shared	 by	 virtue	 ethical	 theories,	 which	 is	 to	 say	most	moral	theories	before	the	rise	of	modern	moral	philosophy.	But	in	the	interest	of	being	more	ecumenical,	I	would	like	to	maintain	my	usage	of	‘good’	and	‘being	good’	so	that	I	can	better	 appeal	 to	 non-virtue	 ethicists	 —	 philosopher	 and	 non-philosopher	 alike.	Furthermore,	 I	 intend	 to	 exploit	 common	 sense	 and	 common	 usage	 in	 regard	 to	 my	terminology	as	much	as	possible.			 That	being	said,	this	section	is	meant	to	present	a	congruity	between	what	most	people	mean	 when	 they	 speak	 of	 ‘being	 good’	 and	 what	 advocates	 of	 an	 agent-centered	 virtue	theory	mean	when	they	speak	of	‘being	virtuous.’	I	hope	this	will	provide	more	justiJication	for	my	 particular	 use	 of	 ‘moral	 goodness’	 in	 this	 paper	 and	my	 appeal	 to	 discussions	 on	virtue	ethics	as	presented	by	various	philosophers,	ancient	and	modern. 	1
	This	section	of	my	paper	is	heavily	inJluenced	by	Julia	Annas	who	who	presents	similar	claims	in	two	of	her	1works:	“Ancient	Ethics	and	Modern	Morality”	(1992)	and	Ch.	2,	§7	of	her	The	Morality	of	Happiness	(1993),	pp.	120-31.
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2.1.	’Being	good’	is	a	kind	of	disposition	 		2	 An	 agent	 seems	more	morally	developed	 if	 her	 good	actions	 are	 sincere,	 if	 they	 come	from	an	effortless	expression	of	what	she	is	already	disposed	to	do. 	Imagine	an	infant	who	3strays	away	from	her	parents	and	starts	crawling	into	a	busy	street.	A	person	who	instantly	rushes	in	to	save	the	child	without	any	deliberation	seems	more	morally	developed	than	a	person	who	rushes	in	to	save	the	child	after	quickly	deciding	that	it	would	be	the	right	thing	to	 do.	 The	 difference	 seems	 to	 come	 from	 the	 former’s	 already-established	 disposition	 to	perform	such	an	action	 in	 such	a	 context. 	To	be	 sure,	both	 individuals	 are	praise-worthy	4and	 good,	 but	 they	 are	 good	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 they	 have	 cultivated	 the	 disposition	 to	perform	good	actions	in	such	morally-salient	contexts.	The	less	they	need	to	struggle	with	enacting	such	behavior,	the	better.		
2.2.	’Being	good’	entails	performing	good	actions.			 Despite	the	above	statement	that	‘being	good’	is	a	disposition	of	the	agent	rather	than	a	quality	 of	 her	 actions,	 no	 one	 could	 deny	 that	 ‘being	 good’	 entails	 ‘doing	 good’	 at	 times; 	5being	 a	 ‘good	 person’	 means	 being	 sensitive	 to	 circumstances	 that	 demand	 appropriate	responses.	More	 importantly,	 exposing	 oneself	 to	 such	 circumstances	 is	 crucial	 for	moral	education	and	moral	development.	The	person	who	deliberates	before	rushing	in	to	save	the	child	would	presumably	require	less	deliberation	in	the	future	if	confronted	with	a	similar	circumstance.	Eventually,	this	individual	would	cultivate	a	sensitivity	to	such	circumstances	that	 would	 dispose	 the	 agent	 to	 act	 freely	 without	 inhibition	 —	 I’m	 taking	 this	 kind	 of	sincerity	paired	with	spontaneity	of	action	to	be	a	mark	of	moral	development.	
	I	acknowledge	that	the	metaphysics	of	dispositions	is	a	current	area	of	contention.	As	I	use	‘disposition’	here,	it	2is	simply	a	condition	in	virtue	of	which	one	is	disposed	to	act.	It	can	be	deemed	a	‘stable	disposition’	that	results	and	is	maintained	by	intelligent	practice.	(Annas,	1993,	pp.	50-52;	see	also	Aristotle’s	Nichomachean	Ethics	II.5)	Aristotle	makes	this	point	by	comparing	the	enkratic	individual	with	the	truly	virtuous	agent	(see	the	3
Nichomachean	Ethics	1142a	26-29;	VII.1-10).	The	highest	ideal	is	not	consistent	self-restraint	but	a	state	where	no	self-restraint	is	necessary.	(Annas,	1993,	pp.	89-91)	The	former	has	acquired	a	dispositional	belief	that	such	an	action	is	appropriate	and,	apparently,	there	are	no	4conJlicting	feelings	that	would	obstruct	her	acting	on	such	a	belief.	The	latter	either	1)	has	the	dispositional	belief	but	is	temporarily	obstructed	by	feelings;	or	2)	does	not	have	the	dispositional	belief	and	must	quickly	acquire	an	occurrent	belief	to	provoke	her	subsequent	response.	As	Annas	(1993)	notes,	“no	sensible	[moral]	theory	could	consider	merely	acts	or	merely	agents”	(p.	125)5
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2.3.	’Being	good’	has	an	affective	dimension.			 If	the	enactment	of	a	good	deed	comes	from	an	effortless	expression	of	one’s	disposition,	the	concurrent	feelings	would	likely	endorse	the	action.	Moral	deliberation	is	not	isolated	to	merely	 a	 rational	 consideration	 of	 possible	 actions;	 it	 involves	 overcoming	 fear,	 disgust,	shock,	apathy,	lethargy,	and	the	like.	A	good	person	—	disposed	and	ostensibly	compelled	to	act	—	 is	 not	 meeting	 resistance	 from	 such	 feelings	 that	 would	 otherwise	 undermine	 or	impede	 an	 appropriate	 response.	 Considering	 the	 developmental	 aspect	 of	 morality,	 it	seems	right	that	becoming	a	good	person	must	involve,	not	 just	 learning	how	to	deal	with	our	 feelings,	 but	 bringing	 our	 feelings	 into	 harmony	 with	 our	 thoughts	 and	 actions. 	 As	6Aristotle	 is	 known	 to	 insist,	 this	harmony	 involves	balance	 (striking	a	mean	between	 two	extremes):	the	savior	of	the	infant	—	like	a	Jireman	in	action	—	should	have	an	appropriate	level	of	fear	—	not	so	little	that	she	is	foolhardy	but	not	so	much	that	it	would	preclude	the	appropriate	action	from	the	outset. 	Additionally,	there	are	obviously	feelings	that	assist	the	7good	 person	 in	 performing	 good	 actions:	 a	 volunteer	 at	 a	 homeless	 shelter	 can	 do	more	good	 if	 she	has	 a	 certain	 amount	of	 compassion,	 loving-kindness,	 and	 sympathetic	 joy;	 in	some	 cases,	 indignation	 and	 anger	 is	 appropriate	 in	 order	 to	 harden	 one’s	 resolve	 for	 a	righteous	cause.		
2.4.	’Being	good’	has	an	intellectual	dimension.			 This	seems	 to	me	a	 less	controversial	 statement	but	some	clariJication	 is	necessary	 in	order	 to	 show	 its	 relationship	 with	 the	 previous	 statements	 above.	 Being	 good	 involves	performing	good	actions,	but	 it	 involves	performing	actions	 for	 the	 right	 reasons. 	 If,	 after	8interviewing	the	savior	of	the	wandering	child,	she	 is	 found	to	be	motivated	purely	by	the	thought	of	a	hefty	cash	reward	(or	by	media	celebrity	or	by	the	accolades	of	her	peers),	the	action	 is	 still	 considered	 good	but	 the	person	 is	 not	—	or,	 rather,	 the	person	 is	 less	 good	because	of	her	motives.	Even	the	person	that	instantly	rushes	in	must	provide	reasons	—	if	
	“Our	development,	and	especially	our	moral	development,	consists	in	our	getting	(more	or	less)	control	over	6these	feelings	and	training	them	in	some	ways	rather	than	others	[…]	it	is	important	to	respect	in	ethical	theory	the	everyday	contrast	between	someone	who	does	the	right	thing,	but	has	to	battle	with	his	feelings	to	do	so,	and	thus	acts	reluctantly	and	with	a	sense	of	pain	and	loss,	and	the	person	who	does	the	right	thing	and	whose	feelings	endorse	the	action,	and	who	thus	acts	gladly	and	with	pleasure.”	(Annas,	1993,	p.	53).	See	Aristotle’s	popular	notion	of	‘The	Golden	Mean’	(Nichomachean	Ethics,	Book	II)7	See	Nichomachean	Ethics	1140a	20-218
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asked	 after-the-fact	 —	 that	 seem	 appropriate	 for	 a	 ‘good	 person.’	 We	 want	 an	 educated	reaction	to	morally	relevant	situation	(Annas,	2011,	p.	29).	If	the	agent	cannot	provide	any	reasons,	 then	 her	 sincerity	 can	 be	 questioned;	 for	 example,	 she	 could	 have	 rushed	 in	 so	quickly	 because	 she	 mistook	 the	 child	 for	 her	 own	 child.	 I	 will	 not	 suggest	 what	 the	appropriate	reasons	a	good	person	would	provide	in	this	context	but	I	will	discuss	how	one	develops	an	educated	response	to	these	situation	in	Part	3	of	this	paper.		
2.5.	Some	additional	remarks	on	moral	goodness		 I’ve	 been	 dwelling	 on	what	 being	 a	 good	 person	 amounts	 to.	 Regardless	 of	 the	moral	theory	one	adopts	—	be	it	a	version	of	consequentialism,	deontology,	or	ethical	egoism	—	I	believe	one	would	accept	 the	above	statements	 to	a	 lesser	or	greater	degree.	The	morally	developed	 consequentialist	would	 not	 spend	 time	 performing	 so-called	 ‘hedonic	 calculus’	while	 the	 child	 wanders	 into	 the	 street.	 The	 morally	 developed	 deontologist	 would	 not	spend	time	consulting	her	set	of	principles	or	applying	Kant’s	 ‘categorical	 imperative.’	The	morally	 developed	 egoist	would	not	 hesitate	 to	 act	when	 confronted	with	 an	opportunity	that	would	beneJit	her.	This	is	because	extensive	training	as	assiduous	moral	agents	would	make	them	receptive	to	the	morally	salient	elements	of	a	given	circumstance	and	they	would	
already	 be	disposed	 to	 respond	 in	 the	way	 their	 theory	demands.	To	be	 sure,	 they	would	respond	 only	 if	 they	 were	 not	 too	 afraid	 or	 apathetic	 to	 commit	 themselves	 to	 their	respective	theories. 	9	 Thus,	actually	 ‘being	good’	—	according	to	common	sense	and	philosophy	—	seems	to	be	a	kind	of	disposition	to	act	 in	appropriate	ways,	 to	which	the	moral	agent’s	 intellectual	and	emotional	life	conform.	If	someone	has	decided	to	perform	good	actions	in	accordance	with	values	she	rationally	endorses,	or	 if	someone	has	decided	to	perform	good	actions	in	
	The	proposal	I	will	present	in	this	paper	is	not	committed	to	any	one	theory	of	the	good.	That	being	said,	it	may	9discourage	a	pluralism	about	the	good	insofar	as	such	theories	introduce	incommensurable	beliefs	about	the	good	life	and	how	a	good	person	should	behave.	The	cognitive	dissonance	introduced	by	embracing	different	notions	of	the	good	would	involve	feelings	that	undermine	or	impede	a	successful	enactment	of	morality	(see	2.3)	and	would	discourage	the	internalization	of	a	stable	moral	disposition.	In	general,	embracing	pluralism	would	make	a	sincerely	good	person	less	likely	or	impossible.	My	proposal	is	more	suited	to	a	monism	about	the	good.	SpeciJically,	it	is	suited	to	a	so-called	‘naturalistic’	theory	deJined	in	the	living	of	a	human	life	rather	than	by	
transcending	human	life	(the	later	theory	is	exempliJied	by	Platonism).	Because	my	proposal	speciJies	the	good	life	in	terms	of	certain	circumstances	(insofar	as	a	moral	agent	needs	to	address	current	socio-cultural	values),	it	is	comfortable	with	Aristotle.	But	I	believe	my	proposal	could	also	be	reconciled	with	less	circumstantial	theories	like	Stoicism	and	Epicureanism	(insofar	as	moral	agents	can	reappropriate	ideas	of	“society”	and	“culture”).
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accordance	 with	 values	 she	 feels	 passionate	 about	 (regardless	 of	 whether	 she	 fully	understands	them),	both	decisions	may	be	evidence	that	she	is	starting	to	bring	her	intellect	and	 feelings	 into	 conformity.	 The	 agent	 is	 on	 her	way	 to	 becoming	 good	 in	 the	 sense	 I’m	concerned	 with.	 The	 key	 is	 that	 she	 is	 continually	 making	 decisions	 and	 this	 entails	 an	intellectual	 engagement	 that	 gradually	 allows	 one	 to	 internalize	 a	 coherent	 network	 of	beliefs	and	corresponding	behavior.		 Continuing	in	this	vein,	a	way	to	approach	morality	is	developmentally.	That	is,	we	can	look	at	how	one	becomes	a	good	person	and	we	can	look	at	the	different	apparent	levels	of	moral	 cultivation	 in	order	 to	extrapolate	and	see	what	 the	 full-Jledged	good	person	might	look	like.	In	the	next	section,	I	will	defend	a	modiJied	version	of	the	so-called	‘skill	analogy’	which	Annas	uses	to	motivate	this	process	of	extrapolation.	Using	her	discussions	and	the	four	statements	that	I’ve	presented	above,	I	will	propose	that	moral	goodness	is	developed	as	
a	kind	of	skill	—	one	becomes	a	good	person	as	one	would	cultivate	a	skill	and	one	exercises	moral	goodness	as	one	would	exercise	a	skill.	A	consequence	of	this	is	that	there	is	a	kind	of	satisfaction	or	enjoyment	 that	comes	with	being	a	good	person	 in	 the	way	 I’ve	suggested.	We	will	have	to	explore	what	this	enjoyment	amounts	to	before	I	argue	my	main	point	that	‘being	good’	positively	correlates	to	‘being	happy’.	
Part	3:	Moral	Goodness	As	a	Skill:	A	defense	and	expansion	of	the	“skill	analogy”		 In	this	portion	of	my	paper,	I	will	adapt	what	Julia	Annas	calls	the	‘skill	analogy’	which	exposes	 similarities	 between	 the	 development	 of	 a	 skill	 and	 the	 cultivation	 of	 moral	goodness	 (in	 the	 context	 of	 Annas’	 discussions,	 this	 is	 the	 cultivation	 of	 virtue	 but	 I	 will	maintain	my	own	terminology	throughout).	After	brieJly	presenting	this	in	the	context	of	my	discussion	 on	 ‘being	 good’	 I	 will	 explore	 a	 potential	 objection	 to	 the	 “skill	 analogy”	 and	respond	to	it	accordingly. 	10	 In	 the	 context	 in	 which	 I’m	 using	 the	 phrase,	 the	 “skill	 analogy”	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 the	practical	reasoning	undertaken	by	a	sincerely	good	person	shares	important	features	with	the	practical	reasoning	undertaken	by	someone	exercising	a	practical	skill	(Annas,	2011,	p.	2).	 Upon	 reJlection,	 this	will	 be	 especially	 obvious	 in	 the	 developmentally	 early	 stages	 of	moral	 cultivation	 (we	 have	more	 intimate	 knowledge	 of	 these	 early	 stages	 and	 less	 so	 of	
	Much	of	my	discussion	in	the	section	has	been	adapted	from	my	own	unpublished	paper	“Virtue	as	the	Skill	of	10Living:	Inducing	the	Good	Flow”	presented	at	Loyola	University	Chicago	on	April	11,	2014.
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very	high	developmental	stages	of	moral	cultivation).	By	conJirming	the	similarities	at	these	early	stages	of	moral	cultivation	and	then	extrapolating	the	Jindings	using	the	skill	analogy,	I	argue	that	the	phenomenology	of	being	a	highly	developed	moral	agent	would	be	similar	to	the	phenomenology	of	the	expert	at	a	practical	skill.	
3.1.	Early	stages	of	moral	development		 The	skill	analogy	is	most	helpful	in	comparing	how	a	person	becomes	good	with	how	a	person	becomes	adept	at	a	practical	skill.	At	the	early	stages	of	moral	and	skill	development,	we	 can	 see	 how	both	 require	 the	monitoring	 and	 targeting	 of	 our	 dispositions	 as	well	 as	signiJicant	intellectual	and	affective	engagement.		 First,	since	—	as	discussed	above	—	‘being	good’	is	a	kind	of	disposition	(a	disposition	to	perform	good	actions	well	and	when	appropriate),	like	any	disposition	“it	requires	time,	experience,	and	habituation	to	develop	it”	(Annas,	2011,	p.	14).	It	makes	sense	that	morality	must	be	consciously	attended	to	in	order	to	either	foster	incipient	good	habits	of	behavior	or	 else	 to	 override	 and	 replace	 ostensibly	 immoral	 tendencies.	 Regardless	 of	 your	moral	theory,	 to	 become	 a	 sincerely	 good	 person	 requires	 time	 and	 effort,	much	 like	 any	 other	complex	skill.		 Second,	 since	 ‘being	 good’	 is	 a	 practical	 disposition	 —	 it	 entails	 performing	 certain	actions	—	like	any	skill,	“it	can	be	learned	only	by	practice,	by	actually	doing	what	needs	to	be	done”	 (Annas,	2011,	p.	16).	We	can	read	about	moral	principles	and	precepts	 in	books	and	 classrooms,	 but	 real	 understanding	 comes	 from	 applying	 these	 principles	 in	 actual	situations.	Likewise,	this	can	also	be	said	of	skills	which	tend	to	involve	learning	curves	that	can	 only	 be	 ameliorated	 through	 practical	 engagement	 with	 the	 task	 in	 question.	 As	Aristotle	observes,	“what	we	need	to	learn	to	do,	we	learn	by	doing;	for	example,	we	become	builders	by	building	.	.	.” 	An	individual	cannot	become	an	expert	builder	by	reading	books	11and	remaining	indoors	—	she	must	gradually	develop	specialized	practical	dispositions	and	habituate	herself	to	specialized	tasks.		 Third,	since	there	is	a	distinct	intellectual	dimension	of	being	a	sincerely	‘good	person,’	this	learning	cannot	be	done	mindlessly.	Our	sincere	and	spontaneous	responses	to	morally-relevant	 situations	 must	 be	 educated	 responses.	 Likewise,	 as	 Annas	 (2011)	 observes,	
	Nichomachean	Ethics	1103.32-3	(trans,	Crisp,	2000)11
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“[b]uilding	is	not	what	we	think	of	as	a	particularly	intellectual	skill,	but	there	is	still	no	such	thing	as	learning	to	be	a	builder	mindlessly,	by	rote	copying”	(p.	17).	This	is	the	same	with	all	skills	worthy	of	the	name	—	skills	that	require	time	and	effort	to	learn.	We	Jirst	need	to	abstract	 the	 relevant	 features	 of	 the	 task	 and	 the	 intermittent	 goals;	 formulate	 rules	 or	maxims	 based	 on	 those	 features	 and	 goals	 (usually	 with	 the	 help	 of	 an	 instructor	 or	 a	manual);	 then	 carefully	 apply	 those	 rules	 in	 real	 situations	 so	 we	 can	 understand	 for	
ourselves	 what	 the	 best	 ways	 to	 perform	 the	 task	 involve	 (Dreyfus	 &	 Dreyfus,	 1991,	 pp.	232-36).	 This	 procedure	 is	 undertaken	 by	 the	 child	 learning	 to	 tie	 her	 shoes,	 by	 the	apprentice	builder	learning	to	build	well,	and	likewise	by	the	person	learning	to	be	a	good.		 Finally,	since	there	is	a	distinct	affective	dimension	of	being	a	sincerely	good	person,	this	learning	cannot	be	done	emotionlessly.	The	difference	between	more	simple	skills	and	the	more	complex	and	dynamic	ones	(like	moral	cultivation)	involve	what	Annas	calls	the	“drive	to	 aspire.”	 This	 affective	 component	 involves	 continually	 Jinding	 motivation	 to	 keep	improving	—	to	stay	engaged	in	the	activity	long	enough	to	achieve	expertise.	(Annas,	2011,	p.	 16ff)	 If	 this	 minimal	 affective	 dimension	 is	 not	 generated,	 then	 “we	 lapse	 into	 simple	repetition	 and	 routine”	 which	 often	 precludes	 mastery	 of	 a	 skill	 (Annas,	 2011,	 p.	 18).	 A	sincerely	good	person	is	one	who	aspires	to	become	better.		
3.2	Later	stages	of	moral	development		 We	would	expect	such	intellectual	and	affective	engagement	to	carry-over	into	expertise	—	 both	 non-moral	 and	 moral	 —	 and	 serve	 as	 a	 means	 to	 sustain	 and	 improve	 one’s	competence	in	the	activity.	So	the	kind	of	habituation	we	would	Jind	in	moral	expertise	as	a	result	of	moral	cultivation	“is	not	routine	but	the	kind	of	actively	and	intelligently	engaged	practical	mastery	that	we	Jind	in	practical	experts	such	as	pianists	and	athletes.	.	 ."	(Annas,	2011,	p.	14):	When	we	see	the	speed	with	which	a	skilled	pianist	produces	the	notes	we	might	be	tempted	 to	 think	 that	 constant	 repetition	 and	habit	 have	 transformed	 the	original	experience,	 which	 required	 conscious	 thought,	 into	 mere	 routine.	 But	 this	 is	completely	wrong.	 The	 expert	 pianist	 plays	 in	 a	way	 not	 dependent	 on	 conscious	input,	 but	 the	 result	 is	 not	 mindless	 routine	 but	 rather	 playing	 infused	 with	 and	expressing	 the	pianist’s	 thoughts	about	 the	piece.	Further,	 the	pianist	 continues	 to	improve	 her	 playing.	 The	 way	 she	 plays	 exhibits	 not	 only	 increased	 technical	
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mastery	 but	 increased	 intelligence	 —	 better	 ways	 of	 dealing	 with	 transitions	between	loud	and	soft,	more	subtle	interpretations	of	the	music,	and	so	on.	(Annas,	2011,	pp.	13-4)	Due	to	such	active	engagement	with	their	respective	activities,	enjoying	both	non-moral	and	moral	expertise	—	when	adequately	developed	—	will	exhibit	what	psychologists	call	Ilow	
experience.	
3.3.	Flow	experience		 When	an	agent	is	completely	engaged	in	an	activity	(oftentimes,	a	very	challenging	one)	and	exercising	a	highly	developed	skill	 therein,	she	can	experience	what	psychologists	call	‘Jlow’	—	 the	 agent	 becomes	 “completely	 involved	 in	 something	 to	 the	 point	 of	 forgetting	time,	 fatigue,	and	everything	else	but	 the	activity	 itself.”	 (Csikszentmihalyi,	Abuhamdeh,	&	Nakamura,	2005,	p.	599)	Some	phenomenological	characteristics	involve	
intense	and	focused	concentration	on	the	here	and	now;	a	loss	of	self-consciousness	as	action	and	awareness	merge;	a	sense	that	one	will	be	able	to	handle	the	situation	because	one	knows	how	to	respond	to	whatever	will	happen	next;	a	sense	that	time	has	passed	more	quickly	or	slowly	than	normal;	and	an	experience	of	the	activity	as	rewarding	 in	 and	 of	 itself	 regardless	 of	 the	 outcome.	 (Nakamura	 &	Csikszentmihalyi,	2001,	pp.	88-9)		 		 One	of	the	most	important	factors	in	the	elicitation	and	preservation	of	Jlow	experiences	is	how	the	experience	engages	one’s	conscious	attention	—	the	agent	becomes	“completely	involved	in	something	to	the	point	of	forgetting	.	.	.	everything	else	but	the	activity	itself”	and	there	 is	 “an	 experience	 of	 the	 activity	 as	 rewarding	 in	 and	 of	 itself	 regardless	 of	 the	outcome.”	 That	 is,	 Jlow	 is	 elicited	 and	 preserved	 only	 when	 the	 motivation	 behind	 the	activity	 takes	 the	activity	 itself	as	 its	direct	object;	 the	agent	 Jinds	 the	activity	 intrinsically	
motivating.			 As	the	phrase	is	used	in	the	psychological	literature,	experiencing	‘intrinsic	motivation’	means	 that	 the	 agent	 is	 operating	 “solely	 out	 of	 a	 sense	 of	 interest	 and	 enjoyment,	 as	
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opposed	 to	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 their	 ends”	 (Besser-Jones,	 2012,	 p.	 96). 	 Classic	 examples	 of	12activities	 that	 often	 include	 intrinsic	 motivation	 include	 physical	 sports	 (e.g.	 basketball,	soccer),	 mental	 ‘sports’	 (e.g	 chess,	 go),	 musical	 events	 (solo	 and	 concert	 pieces),	 and	 a	variety	 of	 other	 activities	 ranging	 from	 rock-climbing	 to	 giving	 an	 engaging	 lecture.	All	 of	these	 activities	 demand	 skill	 and	 when	 these	 activities	 are	 both	 skillfully	 enacted	 and	enjoyed	for	their	own	sake,	Jlow	is	experienced.		 Drawing	on	the	previously	established	similarities	between	‘being	good’	and	exercising	a	practical	skill,	I	propose	that	‘being	good’	can	be	considered	a	special	kind	of	skill	that	—	when	adequately	developed	—	entails	the	elicitation	of	Ilow.	This	claim	is	crucial	for	how	I’ll	be	defending	my	overall	thesis	so	I	would	like	to	anticipate	a	potential	objection	and	quickly	address	the	mistaken	assumptions	upon	which	it	is	based.		 	
3.4.	Objection:	The	absence	of	intrinsically	motivated	moral	goodness		 I	Jind	that	the	greatest	potential	objection	to	the	claim	that	moral	goodness	entails	the	elicitation	of	 Jlow	when	adequately	developed	 is	 in	regards	 to	 the	requirement	 that	moral	action	involve	intrinsic	motivation.	As	stated	above,	such	motivation	seems	to	be	necessary	to	 initiate	 and	 maintain	 the	 high	 level	 of	 engagement	 that	 the	 agent	 enjoys	 in	 Jlow	experience.		 There	seem	to	be	moral	actions	that	produce	a	Jlow	experience	(for	example,	when	the	brave	JireJighter	 is	wholly	engaged	in	the	act	of	putting	out	a	 Jire).	That	being	said,	 taking	the	phenomenon	that	arises	from	the	exercise	of	certain	discrete	moral	actions	(i.e.	the	Jlow	enjoyed	while	 being	 brave)	 and	 then	 extending	 that	 to	 the	 exercise	 of	moral	 goodness	 in	general	(i.e.	the	Jlow	enjoyed	while	‘being	good’)	is	unwarranted.	There	seem	to	be	examples	of	moral	actions	that	cannot	engage	 the	agent	to	the	extent	that	they	would	generate	Jlow.	The	JireJighter	may	experience	Jlow	but	the	philanthropists	donating	to	charity	would	not.	The	 activity	 of	writing	 a	donation	 check	 is	 not	 structured	 in	 a	way	 that	 could	 engage	 the	agent	and	elicit	a	Jlow	experience.	Are	we	excluding	those	kinds	of	activities	in	our	picture	of	
	Although	term	‘intrinsic	motivation’	might	connote	a	different	phenomenon	in	philosophy,	it	has	been	well-12established	in	positive	psychology	since	its	coinage	by	Koch	(1956)	(see	also	Deci	&	Moller,	2005;	Deci	&	Ryan,	2000;	Reiss,	2004;	Ryan	&	Deci,	2000a,	2000b;	Waterman,	2005).	As	Besser-Jones	(2012)	explains,	“the	construct	of	intrinsic	motivation	was	developed	as	a	means	of	describing	the	enjoyment	we	Jind	in	pursuing	challenges,	in	pushing	ourselves	to	learn	and	to	try	new	things”	(p.	95).	It’s	easy	to	see	why	this	is	an	important	element	of	Jlow	experiences.	
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‘being	good’?	If	so,	not	only	would	this	seem	ad	hoc,	but	it	would	cause	us	to	diverge	from	what	common	sense	includes	in	the	notion	of	morality		 A	 source	 of	 engagement	 is	 often	 the	 sense	 of	 harmony,	 unimpeded	 enjoyment,	 and	pleasure	 involved	 in	 the	 activity.	 A	 moral	 agent	 could	 take	 pleasure	 in	 writing	 donation	checks	 but	 such	 pleasure	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 determine	 that	 she	 experiences	 intrinsic	motivation	 (Besser-Jones,	 2012,	 p.	 96).	 To	 establish	 that	 the	 sincerely	 good	 person	 is	intrinsically	 motivated,	 “we	 need	 to	 determine	 whether	 or	 not	 she	 Jinds	 the	 activities	enjoyable	and	so	pleasant,	apart	from	their	connection	to	separable	outcomes”	(p.	97).	This	would	 undergird	 the	 kind	 of	 engagement	 exhibited	 in	 Jlow.	 But,	 again,	 such	 intrinsic	motivation	 seems	 unlikely	 in	 the	 case	 of	writing	 checks.	 Similar	 cases	 are	 ready-at-hand:	“keeping	one’s	promises,	helping	someone	pick	up	papers	she	has	dropped	on	the	sidewalk,	being	a	whistleblower,	 loaning	money	to	a	friend,	raising	money	to	help	victims	of	natural	disasters,	and	so	on”	(p.	100).	All	these	‘mundane	activities’	do	not	seem	to	have	the	kind	of	structure	to	produce	the	kind	of	engagement	necessary	for	Jlow	experience.	They	are	only	performed	because	of	 the	separable	outcomes	 [“…only	because	 they	 fulJill	a	promise,	only	because	 justice	 requires	 it,	 only	 because	 raising	 money	 will	 help	 others…”	 (p.	 100)].	 My	proposal	 that	 ‘being	good’	entails	 the	elicitation	of	 Jlow	experiences	seems	to	be	 incorrect	since	it	implies	that	‘being	good’	is	intrinsically	motivated.	The	motivation	one	derives	while	performing	 such	 ‘good’	 yet	mundane	 activities	 like	writing	 checks,	 etc.	 cannot	 be	 derived	from	the	activities	themselves.			 My	response	will	point-out	an	understandable	yet	mistaken	assumption	made	by	such	an	objection.	I	will	insist	that	it	does	not	properly	address	the	notion	of	‘being	good’	that	I	am	utilizing.	
3.5.	Response:	Being	good	is	intrinsically	motivated		 If	 ‘being	 good’	 is	 considered	 a	 practical	 skill,	 one	must	 Jirst	 consider	 how	 this	 skill	 is	exercised.	 The	 objection	 I	 presented	 above	 makes	 the	 assumption	 that	 ‘being	 good’	 is	exercised	 through	 local	 events	 in	which	 the	 agent	 performs	 discrete	 and	 isolated	 actions	
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that	 reJlect	 discrete	 and	 separable	moral	 traits	 (for	 example,	 the	writing	 of	 a	 check	 as	 a	reJlection	of	the	agent’s	generosity). 	13	 Instead	 of	 assuming	 that	 ‘being	 good’	 is	 exercised	 within	 local	 events	 that	 demand	different	local	skills	to	negotiate,	one	should	interpret	‘being	good’	itself	as	a	‘higher-order’	or	 global	 skill.	 Thus,	 ‘being	 good’	 is	 exercised	 by	 the	 agent	 in	 all	 areas	 of	 her	 life	 as	 a	reJlection	of	her	way	of	being	 in	the	world. 	 ‘Being	good’	 is	 the	skill	and	one	of	 the	many	14manifestations	 of	 that	 skill	 is	 in	 context-sensitive,	 circumstantial	 instances	 of	 ‘doing	good’	(like	writing	a	check	or	making	a	promise,	etc.).	A	helpful	way	to	describe	‘being	good’	is	as	an	enactment	of	a	variety	of	disparate	‘lower-order’	activities	united	by	their	common	source	 in	 the	 agent’s	 moral	 disposition.	 Writing	 a	 check	 is	 not	 engaging	 in	 itself	 but	 if	performing	 such	 ‘mundane	 activities’	 is	 required	 to	 properly	 express	 one’s	 moral	disposition,	 the	 agent	 enjoys	 the	 engagement	 and	 Jlow	 experience	 entailed	 in	 expressing	that	disposition	regardless	of	the	activity.	Again,	the	practical	disposition	of	 ‘being	good’	is	the	skill	and	can	be	exercised	in	a	variety	of	ways.		 At	 this	 point,	 a	 dissimilarity	 becomes	 apparent	 when	 comparing	 ‘being	 good’	 to	 a	normal	skill.	If	we	claim	that	‘being	good’	is	the	skill	(as	opposed	to	discrete	activities)	and	that	 ‘being	 good’	 is	 a	 disposition	 to	 do	 good,	 there	 is	 the	 potential	 absence	 of	 any	 overt	exercise	 of	 this	 skill.	 Although	 one	 has	 a	 disposition	 to	 behave	 a	 certain	 way,	 the	circumstances	 may	 prevent	 one	 from	 manifesting	 such	 a	 disposition	 in	 overt	 action.	 We	would	 say	 that	 a	 sculptor	 is	 exercising	 her	 skill	 only	while	 she	 is	 chiseling	 into	 rock	 and	producing	 a	 sculpture	 or	 that	 a	 pianist	 is	 exercising	 her	 skill	 only	while	 she	 is	 producing	beautiful	music.	But	we	would	not	say	that	the	sculptor	and	the	pianist	are	exercising	their	skills	while	sitting	on	the	couch.	In	contrast,	the	good	person’s	skill	is	always	exercised	(even	
	This	may	conform	to	common	sense:	one	can	‘be	good’	in	one	context	(when	being	a	good	father	or	husband)	13but	not	in	another	(when	being	a	bad	boss	or	colleague).	In	response	to	this,	I	would	insist	that	we	dwell	on	the	earlier	claims	of	the	paper.	If	‘being	good’	is	a	practical	disposition,	then	in	order	to	learn	and	instill	such	a	disposition	one	needs	to	practice	—	one	learns	by	doing.	This	learning	always	takes	place	in	an	embedded	context	and	thus,	realistically,	‘being	good’	cannot	be	abstracted	from	that	context	if	it	is	to	be	useful.	Morality	is	only	compartmentalized	to	the	extent	that	our	lives	are	compartmentalized	and	this	is	probably	not	very	much	(Annas,	2001,	p.	21).	I’ll	have	more	to	say	about	this	in	Part	4.
 I take the term ‘global skill’ from Julia Annas — the earliest use I found is in her book, The Morality of Happiness 14
(1993) in the context of Stoic ethics (p. 378; see also pp. 53-7). A great exploration of the idea is found in her book 
Intelligent Virtue (2011): “In the case of skill, this is obviously a local matter; someone might be a skillful skater while 
having all kinds of unresolved issues in other areas of her life. In the case of virtue, the person’s global state is what is 
relevant to the performance of the action . . .” (p. 75)
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on	the	couch)	insofar	as	they	are	expressing	their	moral	disposition	sincerely	and	without	internal	conJlict	(sometimes,	sitting	on	the	couch	might	be	the	moral	thing	to	do).	Again,	if	the	good	person	were	never	confronted	with	the	opportunity	to	perform	any	overt	acts	of	bravery	or	generosity,	 the	good	person	would	still	be	good	and	this	 inability	 to	act	on	her	disposition	would	be	merely	circumstantial. 		15	 In	response,	I	would	say	that	this	is	not	as	strange	as	it	seems	when	we	discuss	activities	and	skill	as	involving	a	variety	of	several	local	(or,	‘lower	order’)	activities.	Imagine	a	highly	skilled	rock	climber	exercising	her	skill	on	a	challenging	cliff-face.	Any	thoughts	external	to	the	 activity	 itself	—	even	 thoughts	 about	 the	 summit	—	hamper	 the	 skill	 being	 exercised	during	 the	 climb.	 We	 would	 say	 that	 the	 expert	 rock	 climber	 is	 experiencing	 intrinsic	motivation	 insofar	as	 she	 is	 rock-climbing.	But,	while	 traversing	up	 the	 cliff-face,	 the	 rock	climber	often	stops	moving	in	order	to	survey	the	rocks	for	potential	handholds,	to	adjust	a	carabiner,	or	to	put	more	chalk	on	her	hands.	These	lower-order	activities	—	as	it	were	—	are	part	of	the	more	global	(or,	‘higher-order’)	activity	of	rock	climbing	despite	not	involving	overt	 acts	 of	 climbing.	 Although	 it	 seems	 like	 inactivity,	 the	 climber	 is	 still	 receptive	 to	opportunities	and	is	consciously	engaged	with	her	terrain.	Likewise,	if	we	could	imagine	the	
fully	developed	 good	 person	—	 a	moral	 expert	—	 she	would	 be	moving	 through	 life	 and	exercising	 her	moral	 goodness	 continuously,	 surveying	 her	 terrain,	 and	 clearly	 perceiving	any	actions	she	might	have	to	undertake.	Actual	overt	moral	activities	may	be	 few	and	far	between	(and	the	agent	may	not	be	successful	in	these	activities	if	contingencies	disallow	it)	but	that	does	not	discredit	a	sincerely	good	person.	The	good	person	is	good	because	of	an	excellent	 disposition	 built-up	 through	 intelligent	 practice	 that	 allows	 her	 to	 respond	 to	 a	situation	instantly,	without	deliberation,	and	in	accordance	with	that	moral	disposition. 	16
	This	scenario	seems	unlikely	unless	we	entertain	the	notion	of	moral	savants.	Common	sense	insists	that	to	be	15a	good	person	you	must	learn	to	be	good.	This	learning	requires	responding	to	and	reJlecting	on	real	opportunities	to	perform	overt	acts.	On	a	related	issue,	moral	luck	may	play	a	factor	in	the	early	developmental	stages	of	this	moral	cultivation	—	I	don’t	see	this	as	problematic.	The	skill	in	which	I’m	presenting	could	be	designated	a	‘stochastic	skill’	—	one	“in	which	a	failure,	because	of	16contingencies,	to	achieve	the	outcome	is	different	from	a	failure	in	the	exercise	of	the	skill	itself”	(Annas,	1993,	400).	If	an	apparent	failure	in	‘being	good’	occurs,	it	would	either	be	a	result	of	a)	poor	conditions	or	b)	a	defect	in	one’s	disposition.	The	former	would	not	be	an	actual	failure	insofar	as	the	agent	acts	in	accordance	with	her	disposition.	The	latter	would	be	a	failure	but	it	also	reJlects	the	need	for	further	moral	development	so	that	one’s	dispositions	are	more	stable	and	reliable.
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	 Both	 the	 expert	 rock-climber	 in	 the	 above	 scenario	 and	 the	 expert	 moral	 agent	 is	engaged	in	Jlow	insofar	as	they	are	exercising	their	respective	skills	(Annas,	2008,	p.	24).	In	the	 case	 of	what	 I	 deemed	 ‘mundane	 activities’	 (writing	 a	 check	 to	 charity,	 keeping	 one’s	promises,	helping	someone	pick	up	papers,	etc.),	it	is	true	that	they	by	themselves	may	“lack	the	 coherence	 and	 structure	 found	 in	 activities	 associated	with	 Jlow	 experience”	 (Besser-Jones,	 2012,	 p.	 100).	 But	 the	 good	 person	 may	 nevertheless	 engage	 with	 them	 while	enjoying	the	 Jlow	brought	on	by	the	activity	of	 ‘being	good’.	One	might	consider	the	act	of	putting	chalk	on	one’s	hands	mundane	in	itself	but	the	rock	climber	would	still	be	enjoying	Jlow	due	to	the	already-present	Jlow	brought-on	by	the	global	activity	of	rock	climbing.	In	a	similar	fashion,	the	sincerely	good	person	would	go	through	her	days	—	mundane	activities	and	all	—	while	concurrently	exercising	the	highly	developed	skill	of	‘being	good’.	
	 In	the	following	section,	I	will	elaborate	on	what	this	coherency	looks	like	in	regard	to	morality.	 The	 discussion	 of	 Jlow	 experience,	 though,	 should	 be	 a	 helpful	 starting-point	 in	understanding	the	phenomenology	of	moral	expertise.	For	example,	if	you	have	experienced	Jlow	 in	 an	 localized	 case	 while	 playing	 an	 engaging	 game	 or	 sport,	 extrapolating	 that	experience	to	all	aspects	of	your	life	might	provide	some	insight	into	what	will	be	discussed	next.	After	 introducing	 the	notion	of	 ‘vertical	 coherency’,	 I	will	 discuss	 concrete	 examples	and	counterexamples	to	my	proposal.		
Part	4:	Morality	&	Flow	—	Enjoying	the	Good	Flow		 I	 am	 claiming	 that	 ‘being	 good’	 is	 a	 practical	 disposition	 that	 amounts	 to	 a	 skillful	navigation	of	one’s	moral	landscape.	In	the	morally	developed	person,	this	skill	is	exercised	well	 insofar	 as	 one	 is	 responding	 appropriately	 to	 opportunities	 that	 activate	 this	disposition. 			17	 In	order	to	enjoy	a	sustained	Jlow	experience	while	exercising	this	skill,	the	moral	agent	would	have	to	strive	to	perform	optimally	within	her	so-called	‘moral	landscape’.	Unlike	that	of	 the	 rock-climber,	 the	 landscape	 of	 the	 moral	 agent	 admittedly	 involves	 many	 more	dimensions	 that	 interact	 with	 each	 other	 in	 complex	 ways.	 Elaborating	 on	 the	 different	dimensions	 or	 levels	 that	 the	 moral	 agent	 needs	 to	 operate	 within	 would	 allow	 me	 to	illustrate	 how	 ‘being	 good’	 not	 only	 provides	 experiences	 of	 Ilow	but	 how	 ‘being	 good’	 is	
	Again,	note	that	if	circumstances	don’t	allow	for	any	opportunity	for	good	action,	then	the	appropriate	17response	would	perhaps	be	inaction	[see	Annas,	1993,	p.	70	concerning	the	Stoic	notion	of	virtue].	
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positively	 correlated	 with	 a	 very	meaningful	 type	 of	 Jlow	 experience.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 this	section,	 I	 hope	 that	my	 current	 proposal	—	 that	 ‘being	 good’	 is	 a	 global	 skill	—	entails	 a	special	kind	of	 Jlow	experience	 that	 is	not	only	 inherently	enjoyable,	but	also	meaningful.	Part	5	of	this	paper	will	then	explore	the	relationship	between	this	kind	of	experience	and	common	notions	of	happiness.	
4.1.	‘Vertical	coherency’		 There	 are	 several	 levels	 (or,	 ‘dimensions’	 or	 ‘spheres’)	 to	 consider	 when	 discussing	moral	 goodness	 and	 its	 successful	 enactment.	 Much	 like	 how	 the	 expert	 rock-climber	successfully	 scales	 a	 cliff-face	 by	 bringing	 her	 local	 activities	 into	 alignment	 (gracefully	coordinating	her	 legs	and	arms;	accurately	 identifying	proper	hand	and	 footholds;	quickly	adjusting	 the	 carabiners,	 smoothly	 slipping	her	hand	behind	her	back	 to	 	 get	more	chalk,	etc.)	 or	 how	 a	 master	 pianist	 successfully	 plays	 a	 concert	 piece	 by	 bringing	 her	 local	activities	 into	 alignment	 (coordinating	 her	 torso,	 arms,	 hands	 and	 feet;	 quickly	 and	accurately	reading	the	sheet	music;	striking	the	keys	accurately	and	precisely;	articulating	the	keys	and	pedals	to	suit	the	tempo;	etc.),	likewise,	the	genuinely	good	person	successfully	acts	 on	 her	 highly	 developed	 moral	 disposition	 by	 bringing	 her	 local	 activities	 into	alignment.	We	will	 need	 to	 explore	 these	 activities	 and	 how	 they	 relate	 to	 each	 other	 in	order	to	appreciate	what	it’s	like	to	be	a	cultivated	moral	agent.		 Such	‘local’	morally	relevant	activities	should	be	subsumed	under	the	overall	activity	of	being	good	person	(that	 is,	acting	effortlessly	on	one’s	moral	disposition).	These	activities	themselves	should	be	separated	into	a	hierarchical	yet	irreducible	multi-level	model. 	Each	18level	 has	 corresponding	 moral	 standards	 or	 values	 towards	 which	 a	 good	 person	 would	strive	to	meet.	Thus,	being	a	good	person	would	potentially	involve	the	following: 	19
	The	following	model	is	adapted	from	McAdams’	(1995,	1996)	proposals	of	the	four	tier	personality	as	well	as	18further	contributions	by	Sheldon	(2004)	in	his	discussions	on	multi-level	nature	of	subjective	well-being.	[see	also	Haidt	(2006),	pp.	141-45,	226-29]	It	seems	like	you	would	be	able	to	provide	a	moral	theory	using	any	one	of	these	levels	as	your	point	of	19reference.	For	example,	you	can	say	that	our	psychology	demands	that	society	and	culture	be	organized	in	order	to	suit	our	evolutionary	adaptations.	Or,	you	could	say	that	our	religious	(cultural)	values	demand	that	we	slowly	reshape	our	psychology	in	order	to	conform	to	those	higher	standards.	My	notion	of	‘being	good’	is	a	higher-order	property	that	describes	how	an	agent	can	skillfully	bring	all	these	levels	into	alignment.	I’m	not	particularly	concerned	with	what	the	best	way	to	do	that	is	although	I	suspect	that	our	psychology	informs	our	higher	standards	and	puts	constraints	on	what	kinds	of	societies	and	corresponding	norms	could	evolve.
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‘Being	 good’	 means	 skillfully	 bringing	 these	 levels	 into	 alignment	 or	 ‘vertical	 coherency’	with	 each	 other.	 This	 reduces	 impediments	 and	 frustrations	 while	 acting	 on	 one’s	disposition	and	allows	for	the	spontaneity	that	we’re	looking	for	in	truly	good	people. 	At	20the	subjective	level,	the	more	‘vertical	coherency’	is	achieved,	the	more	likely	that	the	global	activity	 of	 ‘being	 good’	 feels	 like	 Jlow	 (i.e.	 effortless	 and	 enjoyable).	 The	 person	 who	instantly	rushes	in	to	save	the	wandering	child	is	acting	in	conformity	with	her	personality	[Level	 1-4]	 and	 also	 her	 socio-cultural	 values	 [Levels	 5-6].	 There	 is	 little	 or	 no	 conJlict	between	any	 level	and	this	 is	what	allows	 the	activity	 to	be	performed	spontaneously	and	effortlessly.	 	Again,	note	 that	 the	skill	of	 ‘being	good’	 refers	 to	a	global	 (or,	 ‘higher-order’)	ability	 in	 making	 all	 of	 these	 levels	 cohere	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 manifesting	 freely	 one’s	dispositions.	The	more	skillful	this	ability	is	executed,	the	more	sincerity	and	spontaneity	is	entailed	in	the	activity	of		‘being	good.’		 This	proposal	is	inJluenced	heavily	by	the	hierarchical	model	of	causal	inJluences	upon	
human	 behavior	 as	 presented	 by	 Dan	 P.	McAdams	 (1995,	 1996)	 and	 Kennon	M.	 Sheldon	(2004).	These	models	—	in	turn	—	were	inJluenced	by	cybernetics	or	‘control	theory’	which	recognizes	 that	 “optimal	 functioning”	 occurs	 “when	 multiple,	 simultaneous,	 separate	processes	 of	 a	 system	 work	 under	 control	 of	 centralized	 decision	 making,	 towards	 a	common	purpose	or	goal”	 (Miller,	1978,	p.	89).	 	 In	 the	context	of	 this	paper,	 the	 “system”	would	 correspond	 to	 the	 holistic	 phenomenological	 experience	 of	 the	 moral	 agent;	 the	“centralized	decision	making”	comes	from	the	agent’s	intellectual	and	affective	engagement	with	 her	 experience;	 the	 “purpose	 or	 goal”	 of	 this	 engagement	 is	 intrinsic	—	 the	 goal	 of	bringing	coherency	among	the	different	 levels	and	allowing	one’s	disposition	 to	act	 freely.	
	“Vertical	coherence	exists	when	lower	level	goals	are	consistent	with	or	regulated	by	higher	level	20goals”	(Sheldon	&	Kasser,	1995,	p.	531)
[Level	1] acting	in	conformity	with	one’s	basic	psychological	needs;[Level	2] acting	in	conformity	with	one’s	personality	or	character	traits;[Level	3] acting	in	conformity	with	one’s	immediate	goals	and	intentions;	[Level	4] acting	in	conformity	with	one’s	self-image	or	self-narrative;[Level	5] acting	in	conformity	with	social	norms	or	values;[Level	6] acting	in	conformity	with	cultural	norms	or	values.
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There	are	 certainly	different	goals	when	 restricting	ourselves	 to	different	 local	 levels	 (the	‘goals’	pursued	 in	 the	service	of	one’s	personality	must	be	articulated	differently	 than	 the	goals	of	the	society	or	culture	with	which	one	identiJies)	but	optimal	functioning	is	achieved	when	these	goals	are	made	consistent	with	each	other.	Optimal	functioning	in	the	context	of	morality	 will	 manifest	 when	 the	 activities	 relating	 to	 our	 personality	 [Levels	 1-4]	 are	consistent	with	and,	thus,	reinforced	by	the	activities	relating	to	our	socio-cultural	context	[Levels	5-6].		 ‘Vertical	coherency’	of	the	kind	I’m	discussing	is	the	mark	of	a	morally	developed	agent.	The	kind	of	 integration	 and	 effortless	 engagement	 this	 skill	 entails	 has	 all	 the	 criteria	 for	eliciting	 what	 I’m	 calling	 a	 ‘global’	 Jlow	 experience.	 Achieving	 this	 coherency	 and	 ‘being	good’	is	a	global	skill	that	concerns	one’s	life	as	a	whole.	The	rest	of	the	section	will	be	an	elaboration	and	defense	of	this	proposal.	I	still	need	to	explain	why	and	how	this	experience	is	positively	correlated	with	‘being	happy’.	
4.2.	The	good	Ilow		 We	can	easily	imagine	how	Levels	1-3	can	produce	Jlow	by	comparing	it	with	a	skill	as	we	have	been	doing.	One’s	psychological	needs,	personality	traits,	and	immediate	goals	are	often	discussed	in	a	non-moral	context	within	the	literature	on	Jlow	experiences.	[…]		 Integrating	Level	4	(self-image	or	self-narrative)	requires	engaging	in	a	skill	that	imposes	personal	meaning	on	one’s	activities.	I	can	produce	an	isolated	instance	of	Jlow	by	engaging	in	a	crossword	puzzle	while	sitting	in	a	hospital	waiting	room.	This	engages	my	need	for	mental	stimulation	[Level	1]	while	catering	to	my	ability	to	work	through	puzzles	[Level	2].	Games	prototypically	involve	intrinsic	motivation	(Nakamura	&	Csikszentmihayli,	2002,	p.	90)	so	engaging	in	the	crossword	puzzle	quickly	aligns	with	my	immediate	goals	[Level	3].	Yet,	it’s	harder	to	integrate	the	crossword	puzzle	into	my	robust	image	of	who	I	am	—	it	surely	would	not	play	a	strong	role	in	my	‘self	narrative’	(my	self-attributed	‘life	story’)	—	and	this	is	why	I	can	be	painlessly	taken	out	of	the	experience	when	my	name	is	called	by	the	nurse.			 As	 I	 stated	above,	bringing	 into	alignment	Level	4	with	Levels	1-3	 require	 the	activity	that	I	perform	to	be	imbued	with	personal	meaning.	The	best	example	of	this	is	in	moments	of	what	Nakamura	&	Csikszentmihayli	 (2002)	 call	 ‘vital	 engagement’:	 “a	 relationship	with	the	world	 that	 is	 characterized	 both	 by	 experiences	 of	 Jlow	 (enjoyed	 absorption)	 and	 by	
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meaning”	 (p.	87).	Yet,	 sources	of	meaning	—	commonly	perceived	—	are	often	 thought	 to	transcend	one’s	own	self-narrative	and	the	endeavors	that	are	informed	by	one’s	self-image.	Thus,	the	experience	of	‘vital	engagement’	should	increase	the	more	one’s	activities	include	the	sense	that	they	serve	a	 larger	purpose.	The	more	one	brings	into	alignment	Levels	1-4	with	 the	 additional	 Levels	 [5	 and	 6],	 the	 more	 meaningful	 the	 engagement	 will	 be	experienced	by	the	agent.			 ‘Being	good’	 is	easily	characterized	as	an	 instance	of	meaningful	engagement	with	 the	world	 when	 we	 understand	 that	 what	 we	 normally	 deem	 moral	 behavior	 is	 that	 which	conforms	to	the	values	held	at	these	various	levels.	Our	personal	values	[Level	4]	are	often	taken	for	granted,	procured	in	early	childhood	by	virtue	of	family,	culture,	and	history.	But	they	can	also	be	actively	formulated	in	response	to	crises	or	traumas	in	which	‘push’	us	to	create	new	understandings	(ibid.	95,	Cf.	Haidt,	2006,	pp.	145-49).	Thus,	bringing	Levels	1-4	into	 alignment	 in	 this	 way	 can	 resolve	 some	 internal	 conJlict	 —	 procuring	 a	 degree	 of	psychological	health	and	well-being.	But,	if	we	can	act	in	accordance	to	our	personal	values	while	also	conforming	to	the	values	apparent	within	our	socio-cultural	context	[Levels	5-6],	we	may	act	in	the	world	essentially	without	any	internal	conJlict	and	with	the	sincerity	and	spontaneity	 that	 we	 Jind	 in	 a	 morally	 developed	 persons.	 At	 the	 subjective	 or	phenomenological	level,	moral	actions	will	be	experienced	by	the	sincerely	good	person	as	a	Jlow	experience;	“however	complex	and	hard	to	navigate	the	circumstances	are,	there	is	no	felt	resistance	to	acting	good,	no	 interference	with	 the	expressing	of	 [moral]	responses	—	that	is,	with	the	expressing	of	one’s	moral	disposition	(Annas,	2011,	p.	75).		 Given	 what	 I	 have	 said	 here	 about	 the	 importance	 of	 integrating	 certain	 personal	features	 of	 one’s	 life	 (e.g.,	 personal	 narrative,	 personality	 or	 character),	 one	might	worry	that	 this	 invites	 a	 kind	 of	 subjective	 relativism.	 Perhaps,	 one	 might	 suggest,	 my	 account	suggests	 that	we	achieve	 “good	 Jlow”	by	acting	 in	 conformity	with	our	personal	narrative	and	character,	whatever	they	happen	to	be.	To	address	this	worry,	we	might	start	by	looking	at	the	roles	played	by	levels	5	and	6	in	moral	development,	which	are	the	requirements	that	one	act	in	conformity	with	social	and	cultural	norms	and	values.	First,	socio-cultural	values	and	 the	agent’s	personal	values	 inform	one	another.	At	a	 common	sense	 level,	 someone	 is	considered	‘good’	when	they	act	in	accordance	with	social	and	cultural	values.	They’re	even	better	when	they	act	on	these	values	sincerely	and	without	internal	conJlict.	Thus,	vertical	coherency	 —	 bringing	 one’s	 personality	 [Levels	 1-4]	 into	 alignment	 with	 one’s	 socio-
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cultural	 values,	 or	 vice	 versa	 —	 allows	 for	 a	 more	 skillful	 navigation	 through	 the	 many	spheres	 of	 one’s	 life.	 But	more	 importantly,	 socio-cultural	 values	 are	 not	 only	 inJluential,	they	 are	 ‘in	 the	 air’	 throughout	 our	 entire	 moral	 development.	 Our	 personal	 values	 are	entangled	with	our	higher-level	values	—	they	are	necessarily	framed	using	the	 ‘language’	provided	to	us	by	our	society	and	culture.		 The	second	reason	why	Levels	5	and	6	are	crucial	for	moral	development	is	due	to	the	parameters	 that	 society	 and	 culture	 provide	 for	 morality.	 A	 serial	 criminal	 may	 not	experience	any	qualms	or	internal	conJlict	when	repeatedly	committing	crimes	but	there	is	conJlict	 and	 instability	 when	 she	 becomes	 frustrated	 as	 a	 result	 of	 municipal	 laws,	condemnations	from	peers	—	in	general,	social	stigmas	and	religio-cultural	prohibitions	(I’ll	have	more	to	say	about	 this	 in	§4.4).	Because	of	 these	 ‘invisible	 lines’,	 so	 to	speak,	certain	behaviors	preclude	the	enjoyment	of	effortless	and	meaningful	navigation	through	certain	swaths	 of	 conceptual	 space.	 The	 ‘lines’	 also	 serve	 to	 guide	 and	 reinforce	 the	 feeling	 of	effortlessness	within	global	Jlow	experiences.		 In	 sum,	 I’m	 not	 only	 characterizing	 ‘being	 good’	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 subjective	 psychological	health	 (enjoying	 the	 psychological	 health	 that	 in	 entailed	 in	 vertical	 coherency)	 but	 also	reconciling	one’s	personality	with	the	values	already-present	in	one’s	socio-cultural	context	—	either	conforming	to	them	or	striving	to	change		them.		 Although	there	may	be	many	objections	to	such	an	ambitious	proposal,	my	concern	from	now	on	will	lay	with	addressing	ostensible	counterexamples	to	it.	In	doing	so,	I	can	address	some	potential	concerns	with	moral	relativism	at	the	individual	and	cultural	level.	In	regard	to	 my	 counterexamples,	 I	 will	 brieJly	 explore	 1)	 ostensible	 examples	 of	 moral	 goodness	without	Jlow	or	without	such	cross-level	integration	and	2)	ostensible	examples	of	immoral	goodness	 that	 could	 produce	 the	 kind	 of	 integration	 and	 Jlow-like	 experiences	 that	 I	 am	claiming	 are	 the	 mark	 of	 moral	 development.	 I	 hope	 to	 show	 how	 my	 model	 can	accommodate	these	circumstances.	
4.3.	Moral	goodness	without	Ilow:	The	case	of	Angela	(objection	1)		 In	 this	 section,	 I	 will	 present	 a	 couple	 hard	 cases	 —	 examples	 of	 moral	 goodness	apparently	 absence	 of	 the	 vertical	 coherency	 and	 global	 Jlow	 that	 I	 proposed	 a	 sincerely	good	person	would	exhibit.	
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	 The	following	is	taken	from	Haybron’s	Pursuit	of	Unhappiness: 	21Consider	 then	 the	 case	 of	 a	 high-ranking	 career	 diplomat,	 Angela,	 who	 is	contemplating	an	early	retirement	at	the	age	of	62:	having	served	her	country	with	great	 distinction	 for	 many	 years,	 Angela	 has	 come	 into	 a	 good	 deal	 of	 money	through	some	canny	investments	and	a	bit	of	luck.	She	has	all	but	decided	to	retire	with	 her	 husband	 to	 a	 villa	 in	 Tuscany,	 and	 could	 do	 so	 very	 comfortably	 on	 her	earnings.	(They	have	a	number	of	good	friends	 in	the	area	and	it	would	bring	her	much	closer	to	her	daughter	and	grandchildren,	who	reside	in	Milan.)	She	correctly	envisages	that	a	life	there	would	be	tremendously	satisfying,	occupied	largely	with	good	company	and	food	and	drink,	walking	the	countryside	and	catching	up	on	her	reading	—	in	short,	kicking	back	and	just	enjoying	 life.	 .	 .	Before	she	can	settle	on	her	 plans,	 however,	 a	 political	 crisis	 arises	 overseas	 and	 she	 is	 asked	 to	 take	 an	important	post	where	her	considerable	wisdom	and	skills	would	be	of	great	use.	.	.	Naturally,	 the	 assignment	 would	 be	 taxing	 and	 heavy	 on	 travel,	 and	 frequently	would	 involve	 dealing	 with	 unwholesome	 individuals	 about	 matters	 of	 extreme	gravity,	often	calling	for	a	fair	measure	of	anger	and	indignation	on	her	part.	 .	 .	No	one	would	dream	of	begrudging	her	the	comfortable	life	she	had	begun	to	set	before	herself.	Yet	she	accepts	the	assignment	without	regret:	the	stakes	are	high	enough	that	she	feels	they	are	probably	worth	it.	She	goes	on	to	serve	admirably	and	with	a	good	deal	of	success	in	sustaining	the	peace,	but	another	six	years	pass	before	she	can	take	her	retirement	.	.	.	(pp.	161-2)	Although	Angela	seems	to	be	a	better	person	by	taking	the	assignment,	the	decision	seems	to	 introduce	more	discord	 into	her	 life.	 If	 that’s	 the	case,	being	a	better	person	would	not	seem	to	put	her	 in	a	better	position	to	 integrate	the	different	activities	that	correspond	to	the	different	 levels	of	her	 life;	she	does	not	seem	to	be	able	 to	enjoy	 the	kind	of	 Jlow	that	results	 from	 such	 vertical	 coherency.	 In	 contrast,	 living	 in	 a	 more	 peaceful,	 more	accommodating	 atmosphere	 like	 Tuscany	 would	 allow	 Angela	 to	 pursue	 the	 sorts	 of	activities	 that	appeal	 to	her	and	would	presumably	allow	her	 to	successfully	 integrate	 the	different	levels	of	her	personality	in	a	satisfying	way.		 In	response	to	this	counterexample,	I	would	note	that	it	is	difJicult	to	judge	which	Angela	is	a	better	person	(Tuscan	Angela	or	Diplomat	Angela)	since	‘being	good’	cannot	be		dictated	merely	by	the	choices	she	makes	but	more	so	by	how	she	makes	those	choices.	I	will	assume	that	a	good	person	would	take	the	assignment	if	given	the	opportunity,	knowing	that	it	is	the	best	option	in	that	context.	If	being	a	good	person	is	a	global	skill	that	is	exercised	as	a	result	of	 integrating	 the	 levels	of	one’s	personality	and	socio-cultural	values,	we	have	 to	explore	whether	 or	 not	 Angela	 is	 allowing	 for	 more	 vertical	 coherency	 when	 she	 takes-up	 the	
	See	also,	Neera	Badhwar’s	response	(2014,	p.	207ff)21
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assignment.	 If	 that’s	 the	 case,	 I	 would	 insist	 that	 she	 would	 be	 exposed	 to	 more	opportunities	 for	 Jlow	experiences	 than	she	would	be	 in	Tuscany.	 If	 it’s	not	 the	case,	 then	this	serves	as	a	legitimate	counterexample	to	my	proposal.			 An	 evaluation	 of	 which	 choice	 provides	 more	 vertical	 coherency	 must	 take	 into	consideration	 Angela’s	 personality	 [Level	 1-4]	 and	 how	 it	 conforms	 to	 her	 socio-cultural	values	 [Level	 5-6].	 The	 key	 to	 answering	 the	 former	 is	 in	 Haybron’s	 characterization	 of	Angela’s	decision:	 “she	accepts	 the	assignment	without	regret:	 the	stakes	are	high	enough	that	 she	 feels	 they	 are	 probably	 worth	 it.”	 Although	 we	 don’t	 know	 how	 sincerely	 she	initially	 responded	 to	 the	 opportunity,	 her	 choice	 was	 made	 without	 subsequent	 regret.	Haybron	needs	to	convey	this	fact	in	order	to	assure	the	reader	that	Angela	was	sincere	in	her	convictions	and	was	not	met	with	internal	conJlict.	If	the	story	went	“she	accepted	the	assignment	 with	 regret,”	 Angela	 would	 seem	 less	 good.	 I	 agree	 wholeheartedly	 with	Haybron	that	“no	one	would	dream	of	begrudging	her	the	comfortable	life	she	had	begun	to	set	before	herself,”	but	 if	 forced	 to	compare	 the	 two	hypothetical	portrayals,	 the	Diplomat	Angela	with	no	regrets	 seems	to	have	achieved	more	vertical	coherency.	Regardless	of	her	success,	she	endorses	the	decisions	she	makes	and	this	 is	 the	sincerity	that	we	appreciate	when	evaluating	whether	someone	is	actually	good.			 As	Annas	notes		an	 action	 won’t	 be	 performed	 easily	 and	 enjoyably	 if	 there	 is	 interference	 from	attachment	to	goals	that	are	in	tension	with	what	the	person	is	doing	in	the	action.	An	action	will	 then	not	be	 fully	generous,	say,	 if	accompanied	by	 felt	regrets	about	the	money	 or	 time	 spent,	 and	 thoughts	 about	 how	 else	 the	money	 or	 time	might	have	been	spent	more	gratifyingly.	(p.	75)		Even	if	the	action	is	good,	the	agent	is	good	only	to	the	degree	that	she	has	achieved	vertical	coherency	and	can	act	in	conformity	with	the	values	exhibited	at	each	level	of	her	life.		 This	does	not	mean	that	‘being	good’	always	demands	the	kind	of	supererogatory	action	that	 Angela	 seems	 to	 be	 performing.	 Indeed,	 if	 Angela	 were	 not	 such	 a	 talented	 and	experienced	diplomat,	the	decision	to	leave	her	family	and	return	to	such	demanding	work	at	her	age	would	seem	foolish.	The	less	her	talent	area	would	help	her,	the	more	foolish	the	choice	would	be.	Since	Angela	“goes	on	to	serve	admirably	and	with	a	good	deal	of	success	in	sustaining	the	peace,”	it’s	apparent	that	she	was	cognizant	of	her	talent	area	and	how	to	successfully	implement	it.	We	can	draw	a	parallel	with	a	volunteer	JireJighter	who	is	asked	to	help	rescue	people	from	a	burning	building.	If	the	JireJighter	is	not	trained	for	the	speciJic	
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circumstance,	she	might	be	admirable	but	the	choice	was	not	a	good	one.	She	would	rush	in	and	 encounter	 difJiculties	 which	 would	 impede	 a	 successful	 rescue.	 Acknowledging	 her	talent	area	and	being	able	to	reconcile	it	with	her	higher	values	is	what	allows	Angela	to	Jind	diplomacy	engaging.		 Finally,	 it’s	 likely	 that	 Angela	 experienced	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 ‘vital	 engagement’	 in	 the	context	of	her	work	and	how	it	contributed	to	her	society	or	culture.	It’s	not	enough	that	she	Jinds	that	diplomacy	aligns	well	with	her	temperament,	developed	talents,	immediate	goals,	and	self-image	 [Levels	1-4].	To	 function	optimally	—	so	 to	speak	—	she	needs	 to	 Jind	her	work	meaningful	in	the	context	of	her	self-image	and	in	the	context	of	her	society	or	culture	[Levels	5-6].	Work	can	be	experienced	as	a	‘job,’	if	the	goal	is	Jinancial	rewards;	a	‘career,’	if	the	goal	is	opportunities	for	advancement;	or	a	‘calling,’	if	the	goal	is	itself	the	“enjoyment	of	fulJilling,	socially	useful	work”	(Wrzensniewski,	McCauley,	Rozin,	and	Schwartz,	1997,	p.	21).	Since	Angela	was	able	 to	exercise	her	 talent	related	to	diplomacy	and	she	 found	her	work	important	in	a	larger	sense,	it	is	likely	that	she	enjoyed	a	high	degree	of	vertical	coherency	between	her	personality	[Levels	1-4]	and	the	socio-cultural	context	[Level	5-6]	in	which	her	work	is	deemed	important	—	a	“calling.”	If	she	moved	to	Tuscany,	it	is	possible	that	her	daily	activities	are	not	going	to	fall	within	her	talent	area.	Moreso,	her	daily	activities	will	seem	less	important	in	a	larger	sense	and	alignment	with	her	strong	socio-cultural	values	will	be	less	 likely.	 Longitudinal	 studies	 show	 that	 people	 “still	 committed	 to	 involvement	 in	 their	talent	area	were	more	likely	than	their	less	committed	peers	to	have	found	the	activity	both	absorbing	 and	 important”	 —	 both	 criteria	 for	 vital	 engagement	 (Nakamura	 &	Csikszentmihalyi,	 2002,	 p.	 96	 citing	 Csikszentmihalyi	 et	 al.,	 1993).	 Thus,	 since	 Angela	 is	‘good,’	she	enjoys	a	meaningful	and	persistent	global	Jlow	experience	as	a	result	of	achieving	vertical	coherency	and	acting	freely	from	her	moral	disposition. 	22
4.4.	Flow	without	moral	goodness:	The	case	of	Unscrupulous	(objection	2)		 There	is	another	hard	case	that	is	related	to	the	brash	diplomat,	the	brash	JireJighter,	or	—	for	that	matter	—	the	brash	child	savior	who	could	achieved	a	kind	of	personal	coherency	and	yet	may	have	been	motivated	by	immoral	or	just	wrongheaded	intentions.	Aren’t	there	
	As	noted	by	my	Justin	Tiwald	in	a	personal	correspondence,	there	is	another	way	of	Angela	achieving	vertical	22coherency	even	while	enjoying	her	retirement	in	Tuscany:	by	adjusting	her	values,	revising	the	personal	narrative,	etc.	I	also	would	acknowledge	that	option.
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examples	of	immorality	that	could	produce	the	kind	of	absorption	and	Jlow-like	experiences	that	 we	 say	 are	 the	mark	 of	moral	 development?	 Simply	 put,	 my	 answer	 is	 no.	 This	 has	mostly	to	do	with	the	inability	to	abstract	oneself	from	a	larger	socio-cultural	context.	Any	coherency	 that	 exists	 solely	 at	 the	 level	 of	 personality	 is	 plagued	 by	 frustration	 and	instability.	Moreso,	I	would	insist	that	purely	personal	coherency	is	highly	unlikely.		 In	order	to	articulate	the	objection,	I	will	devise	my	own	counterexample	adapted	from	those	 presented	 by	 Bernard	 Williams	 (1985),	 Brad	 Hooker	 (1998),	 and	 Neera	 Badhwar	(2014).	Consider	a	person	we’ll	 name	 ‘Unscrupulous’	 (Hooker,	p.	 149ff)	who	 is	 very,	 very	bad	and	also	a	very	successful	mobster	(Badhwar,	2014,	p.	189ff).	Because	of	his	 immoral	success	and	non-moral	skills,	Unscrupulous	 is	not	miserable	at	all	but,	 “by	any	ethological	standard	 .	 .	 .	 dangerously	 Jlourishing”	 (Williams,	 1985,	 p.	 46).	He	 perhaps	 has	 non-moral	skills	 that	 are	 “justiJiable	 objects	 of	 admiration	 to	 others,	 and	 a	 source	 of	 pride	 for	 the	person	 who	 has	 them.”	 For	 example,	 clever	 repartee,	 ingenuity	 at	 planning	 heists,	daredevilry	and	physical	prowess	while	escaping	the	law,	ambidextrous	gunmanship	skills,	etc.	 (Badhwar,	 2014,	 p.	 192).	 	 Furthermore,	 Unscrupulous’	 success	 as	 a	mobster	 and	 his	intimate	role	within	the	mob	‘family’	affords	him	values	to	which	he	can	conform	while	also	insulating	 him	 from	 the	 opposing	 values	 society	 at-large	 hold.	 Thus,	 it	 seems	 that	 he	 can	enjoy	 a	 degree	 of	 vertical	 coherency	 not	 only	 involving	 his	 personality	 but	 also	 his	more	localized	 socio-cultural	 values.	 This	 would	 seem	 to	 provide	 him	 with	 meaningful	 and	persistent	 Jlow	 experiences	 that	 I	 have	 previously	 described	 as	 the	 mark	 of	 moral	development.		 The	purpose	of	presenting	this	counterexample	 is	 to	show	how	our	 intuitions	seem	to	endorse	 the	 view	 that	 someone	 can	 be	 well-off,	 “Jlourish,”	 and	 enjoy	 non-moral	achievements	 without	 being	 moral	 —	 without	 ‘being	 good’.	 But	 regardless	 of	 the	intermittent	and	unstable	moments	of	pleasure	that	Unscrupulous	might	enjoy,	I	will	insist	that	he	cannot	attain	the	degree	of	vertical	coherency	and	meaning	—	that	is,	the	degree	of	‘vital	 engagement’	—	 that	 a	 moral	 person	 could	 attain.	 This	 is	 primarily	 because	 of	 two	reasons.		 First,	 although	 Unscrupulous	 may	 be	 able	 to	 Jind	 meaning	 in	 his	 mob	 ‘family’	 by	conforming	 to	 the	 values	 that	 it	 collectively	 endorses,	 it	 would	 be	 impossible	 to	 abstract	himself	from	the	larger	socio-cultural	context	(as	mentioned	in	§4.2).	I	suppose	it	could	be	possible	to	be	enculturated	solely	by	the	‘family’	if	Unscrupulous	was	“born	into	the	mob”	in	
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some	strong	sense	and	subsequently	indoctrinated	by	it	over	his	early	developmental	years.	Nevertheless,	the	mob	itself	exists	dependent	upon	its	larger	law-abiding	community.	Much	like	how	a	person	who	achieves	 coherency	 solely	 at	 the	 level	of	personality	 is	plagued	by	frustration	 and	 instability,	 a	 mob	 ‘family’	 collectively	 is	 plagued	 by	 frustration	 and	instability.	 Being	 a	 member	 of	 this	 organization	 would	 mean	 to	 experience	 the	 negative	effects	of	mob	values	in	conJlict	with	those	of	the	larger	community.	It	seems	highly	unlikely	that	 Unscrupulous	 and	 any	member	 of	 the	mob	 ‘family’	 could	 navigate	 freely	 within	 the	parameters	 that	 the	 larger	 society	 and	 culture	 provides	 while	 being	 insulated	 from	reprimands,	 stigmatization,	 and	 confrontations	 with	 other	 organizations.	 Thus,	 it	 seems	very	 likely	 that	 his	 experiences	 of	 Jlow	 as	 a	 result	 of	 non-moral	 expertise	 would	 be	constantly	thwarted	and	frustrated.		 Second,	even	if	the	mob	‘family’	and	its	members	thrive	and	excel	as,	say,	‘a	meaningful	counterbalance	to	the	values	of	the	larger	community,’	I	would	insist	that	vertical	coherency	is	still	highly	unlikely.	This	is	due	to	the	need	for	‘horizontal	coherency’	at	each	level	of	our	model.	I	will	dwell	a	little	on	this	point	since	it	also	serves	as	a	response	to	a	kind	of	cultural	relativism.	
4.5	‘Horizontal	coherency’	As	Sheldon	and	Kasser	(1995)	 insist,	 ‘horizontal	coherency’	 is	necessary	 in	order	to	make	‘vertical	coherency’	feasible:		In	addition	to	 lower-to-higher	 level	connections,	systemic	[vertical]	coherence	also	implies	connections	among	elements	at	the	same	level	of	a	hierarchy	[i.e.	‘horizontal	coherency’].	 .	 .	Speaking	from	a	bottom-up	perspective,	connections	at	 lower	levels	presumably	make	 vertical	 coherence	 easier	 to	 achieve.	 Speaking	 from	 a	 top-down	perspective,	 higher	 level	 synthesis	 can	 help	 forge	 connections	 among	 lower	 level	elements	(p.	532).	So,	 if	Unscrupulous	does	not	have	a	coherent	self-image	or	self-narrative	 (for	example,	he	wants	to	be	a	mobster	but	also	thinks	of	himself	as	an	artist),	he	 is	 less	 likely	to	maintain	vertical	coherency	(due	to	the	fact	that	his	mob	‘family’	values	would	probably	discourage	or	conJlict	with	his	artistic	aspirations).			 But	regardless	of	Unscrupulous’	aspirations,	 there	seems	to	be	a	systemic	 incoherency	within	 any	 immoral	 organization	 like	 the	mob.	 That	 is,	 it	 seems	 that	mob	 ‘family'	 values	must	 necessarily	 reJlect	 incoherent	 beliefs	—	 at	 least	when	 it	 comes	 to	 honesty,	 fairness,	
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respecting	 property,	 open-mindedness,	 etc.	 That	 is,	 the	 kind	 of	moral	 decency	 that	 these	values	convey	are	not	only	important	to	promote	when	maintaining	harmony	within	a	group	like	the	mob	‘family’,	they	are	also	the	values	that	must	be	opposed	when	pursuing	immoral	endeavors.	 	23	 Even	 in	 basic	 college	 ‘critical	 thinking’	 texts,	 this	 is	 the	 kind	 of	 incoherency	 that	 is	portrayed	as	an	unbeneJicial	feature	one’s	worldview.	If	our	beliefs	and	theories	about	the	world	are	inconsistent	with	each	other,	we	are	less	likely	to	succeed	at	our	endeavors:		a	 theory	 helps	 increase	 our	 understanding	 by	 Jitting	 our	 beliefs	 into	 a	 coherent	pattern.	When	some	of	our	most	fundamental	beliefs	conJlict	with	one	another,	the	relevant	theory	is	in	trouble	and	our	understanding	is	decreased.	.	.	To	achieve	true	understanding,	 we	 must	 somehow	 resolve	 the	 inconsistency.	 Likewise,	 if	 the	theories	 that	 make	 up	 our	 worldview	 are	 inconsistent	 with	 one	 another,	 there	 is	obviously	something	wrong	with	our	worldview.	At	least	one	of	our	theories	must	be	Jlawed	and	some	of	our	beliefs	must	be	wrong.	Our	understanding	of	 the	world	 is	decreased,	 and	 our	 prospects	 for	 success	 (however	 we	 deJine	 it)	 are	 dimmed.	(Vaughn,	2016,	p.	441)	As	we	would	expect,	 there	are	some	worldviews	that	are	better	as	a	result	of	 their	beliefs	and	 theories	 about	 oneself,	 one’s	 social	 values,	 or	 one’s	 cultural	 values	 being	 coherent	 at	their	 respective	 levels.	 Being	 a	 criminal	 exhibits	 less	 horizontal	 and,	 thus,	 less	 vertical	coherency	because	the	worldview	of	a	criminal	is	plagued	by	inconsistencies	that	manifest	as	frustrated	motives	and	intentions.	This	frustration,	in	turn,	precludes	any	real	enjoyment	of	sustained	and	meaningful	global	Jlow	experiences.	
4.6	A	hard	case:	the	successful	slaveholder	The	following	scenario	is	mentioned	in-passing	by	Daniel	Haybron	(2008):	[Consider	a]	successful	Southern	slaveholder	who	enjoys	the	approbation	of	his	community	and	a	comfortable	existence	with	a	loving	family[.	This	person]	has	obvious	moral	shortcomings,	yet	it	is	hard	to	see	in	what	sense	his	life	must	be	‘impoverished.’	Why	must	he	be	in	any	way	worse	off	than	he	would	be	were	he	more	enlightened	about	human	equality?	Why	must	he	be	worse	off	than	a	morally	better	counterpart	who	enjoys	as	much	wealth,	comfort,	success,	love,	and	reputation,	but	without	ever	wronging	anyone?	(We	can	assume	that	both	are	well-settled	in	their	moral	convictions,	equally	convinced	of	their	righteousness.)	(p.	159)	
	I	think	that	Neera	Badhwar	(2014)	does	a	good	job	making	this	point	for	her	own	purposes	(in	defense	of	a	23kind	of	eudaimonism).
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The	case	of	the	slaveholder	can	be	formulated	as	a	response	to	this	paper’s	proposal	by	insisting	that	the	slaveholder	has	achieved	vertical	coherency	between	his	personal	values,	goals,	and	self-image	along	with	the	surrounding	socio-cultural	values.	The	slaveholder	“enjoys	the	approbation	of	his	community”	and	is	perhaps	insulated	from	the	insinuations	of	Northern	abolitionists.			 Although	I	acknowledge	this	objection	as	a	hypothetical	scenario,	I	would	like	to	consider	further	the	historical	context	of	such	a	character.	For	this	objection	to	be	effective,	it	would	be	helpful	to	imagine	a	slaveholder	that	enjoyed	his	success	well	before	1860.	The	closer	to	Abraham	Lincoln’s	campaign	and	election,	the	more	anxiety	slaveholders	felt.	They	were	continuously	challenged	to	reconsider	their	assumptions	about	slavery;	the	more	exposed	to	the	national	dialogue,	the	more	ambivalence	was	expressed	in	their	correspondences	and	diaries. 	Furthermore,	regardless	of	when	he	lived,	it	would	be	24helpful	to	imagine	our	successful	slaveholder	closed-off	to	the	national	dialogue	altogether.	This	is	because,	even	in	the	18th	century,	there	were	organizations	who	called	for	the	abolition	of	slavery	or	the	‘repatriation’	of	African	slaves	and	who	thus	challenged	the	ideologies	of	slaveholders.	We	would	have	to	suppose	a	moderately	isolated	—	yet	successful	—	slaveholder	living	in	blissful	close-mindedness.	I	don’t	think	this	is	difJicult	to	imagine.		 Furthermore,	regardless	of	being	sheltered	from	opposing	ideologies	which	expose	inconsistencies	in	his	own,	there	was	never	a	time	when	slave	unrest	and	rebellions	were	not	a	concern.	Such	an	ever-present	threat	to	the	slaveholder	enterprise	would	understandably	be	cause	for	anxiety	and	would	itself	challenge	the	legitimacy	of	the	
	A	fascinating	illustration	of	the	mounting	anxiety	and	ambivalence	of	Southern	slaveholders	can	be	found	in	24Moore	(1993).	There,	we	Jind	a	widowed	slaveholder,	Keziah	Goodwyn	Hopkins	Brevard	writing	in	her	diary	after	the	election	of	Lincoln:	“I	have	never	been	opposed	to	giveing	[sic]	up	slavery	if	we	could	send	them	out	of	our	country	—	I	have	often	wished	I	had	been	born	in	just	such	a	country	—	with	all	our	religious	previleges	[sic]	&	liberties	with	none	of	them	in	our	midst	—	if	the	North	had	let	us	alone	—	the	Master	&	the	servant	were	happy	with	out	advantages	—	but	we	had	had	vile	wretches	ever	making	the	restless	worse	than	they	would	have	been	&	from	my	experience	my	own	negroes	are	as	happy	as	I	am:	—	happier.”	Just	to	note,	the	proposal	of	colonizing	blacks	(in	particular,	to	what	is	now	Liberia)	was	proposed	by	Americans	since	the	Revolutionary	War.	As	for	the	fantasy	of	her	“happy”	slaves,	Brevard	—	in	a	later	diary	entry	—	exposes	her	own	view	as	wishful	thinking.	She	relates	how	she	become	angry	“when	I	Jind	out	their	feelings	to	me	—	with	all	I	have	done	for	them	.	.	.	I	am	every	now	&	then	awakened	by	the	fact	that	they	hate	me.”	She	wishes	she	could	“cast	them	off	without	scruples	of	conscience,”	but	believes	she	cannot	“without	a	rebuke	from	my	Heavenly	father.”	She	acknowledges	that	all	slaves	“would	aim	at	freedom	—	‘tis	natural	they	should	&	they	will	try	for	it.”	It	is	not	difJicult	to	imagine	the	discordance	present	in	the	mind	of	the	average	antebellum	slaveholder.	
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slaveholder’s	beliefs.	All	these	factors	jeopardize	the	horizontal	coherency	of	the	slaveholder	—	the	consistency	of	the	slaveholder	worldview	—	at	different	levels.	Horizontal	incoherency,	in	turn,	would	make	vertical	coherency	unstable	and	short-lived.			 Now,	to	be	even	more	charitable	to	the	objection,	we	might	assume	a	successful	slaveholder	who	is	not	concerned	with	unrest	or	rebellion;	he	would	not	be	be	plagued	by	anxiety	or	ambivalence	towards	his	enterprise.	In	responding	to	this,	I	will	address	two	types	of	slaveholders	that	could	potentially	establish	this	state-of-mind:	the	active	slaveholder	and	the	passive	slaveholder.		 An	active	slaveholder	would	be	one	who	embraces	the	slaveholder	role	and	who	would	play	an	active	role	in	the	management	of	the	‘property’	alongside	his	overseer.	The	slaves	would	be	monitored;	their	motives	would	be	anticipated;	unrest,	laziness,	and	dissension	would	be	appropriately	discouraged;	and	potential	rebellions	would	be	successfully	quashed.	The	question	is	whether	these	activities	could	provide	both	absorbed	enjoyment	(Jlow)	and	meaning	as	a	result	of	vertical	coherency.	I	suspect	not.		 The	activities	involved	in	this	active	slaveholding	(monitoring	the	slaves;	anticipating	their	motives;	appropriately	discouraging	unrest,	laziness,	and	dissension)	would	have	to	conform	to	the	slaveholder’s	basic	psychology	[Level	1]	and	character	traits	[Level	2].	In	response	to	this,	I	Jind	it	unlikely	that	these	unsavory	activities	would	be	endorsed	by	a	healthy	human	psychology.	Although	meaning	might	be	provided,	I	would	expect	the	unsavoriness	of	the	activities	would	effect	the	enjoyment	gleaned	from	this	work	—	thus,	making	vital	engagement	(enjoyment	and	meaning)	unlikely.	For	example,	to	enact	some	of	these	“unsavory”	activities	with	proJiciency	would	require	an	intimate	familiarity	with	the	human	beings	that	the	slaveholder	and	overseer	is	subjugating	(e.g.	anticipating	the	motives	and	intentions).	Concurrently,	it	would	also	require	an	absence	of	any	empathy	on	the	part	of	the	slaveholder	that	might	undermine	the	enactment	of	other	activities	(e.g.	discouraging	unrest,	laziness,	and	dissension).	Taken	together,	these	two	criteria	seem	to	demand	a	deviation	from	a	healthy	psychology	[Levels	1-2]. 	Thus,	there	is	less	likely	to	be	horizontal	25
	Basic	empathy	as	a	result	of	mirror	neurons	is	especially	active	in	response	to	the	intentions	or	motives	of	25other	human	beings.	The	“deviation	from	a	healthy	psychology”	could	be	merely	non-conscious	suppression	of	any	emotions	towards	slaves	(as	a	result	of,	say,	the	dehumanizing	portrayal	of	black	africans	at	the	time).	On	the	other	hand,	this	lack	of	empathy	could	be	the	result	of	sociopathy.	Whatever	the	deviation,	there	is	less	likely	to	be	horizontal	coherency	at	the	more	basic	levels	of	the	personality	[Levels	1-2]	and,	thus,	there	is	less	likely	to	be	vertical	coherency	at	the	personal	level	[Level	1-4]	despite	there	being	an	alignment	between	any	higher	levels	[i.e.	Levels	3-6].
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coherency	at	the	more	basic	levels	of	the	personality	[Levels	1-2]	and	at	the	levels	of	personality	in	general	[Level	1-4].	Meaning	might	be	found	in	the	work	due	to	the	larger	society	and	culture	apparently	endorsing	the	institution	of	slavery,	but	the	work	itself	would	become	tedious	and	grueling	since	one’s	psychology	would	not	allow	an	absorbed	enjoyment. 		26	 In	contrast,	the	passive	slaveholder	would	not	actively	participate	in	the	management	of	the	‘property.’	He	would	be	relatively	aloof	and	hands-off	with	his	enterprise;	he	would	not	interact	personally	with	his	slaves	—	leaving	it	to	his	overseer.	If	we	assume	that	such	a	slaveholder	can	be	“successful,”	then	he	would	insulate	himself	not	only	from	other	ideologies	but	also	from	the	“unsavory”	activities	—	those	activities	that	otherwise	would	corrode	his	presumably	healthy	psychology.	In	response	to	this	scenario,	my	view	would	seem	to	allow	this	hands-off	slaveholder	to	enjoy	much	more	vertical	coherency	—	and,	thus,	vital	engagement	(absorbed	enjoyment	and	meaning)	—	than	his	more	active	counterpart.	I	think	this	makes	sense.	But	note	that	how	he	is	able	to	achieve	such	vital	engagement	—	by	not	playing	an	active	role	in	slaveholding.	That	is,	a	slaveholder	could	only	be	said	to	exercise	moral	goodness	as	this	paper	is	deJining	it	only	insofar	as	he	is	not	embracing	the	activities	involved	in	slaveholding.	Instead,	it	would	be	more	accurate	to	say	that	he	achieves	vital	engagement	with	his	non-slaveholding	activities	—	those	involved	in	his	role	as	a	father	or	husband	or	community	member.			 This	might	be	disappointing	for	those	that	prefer	a	more	black-and-white	picture	of	the	moral	landscape	but	it’s	helpful	to	dwell	on	the	conclusion	of	this	thought	experiment.	The	proposal	presented	in	this	paper	provides	the	language	to	articulate	why	slaveholders	exhibit	less	moral	goodness	the	more	they	play	an	active	role	in	the	morally	repugnant	aspects	of	slavery.	This	is	because	the	actual	activity	of	slaveholding	is	not	something	with	which	one	can	achieve	vertical	coherency.	My	proposal	acknowledges	that	slaveholders	were	able	to	enjoy	intermittent,	episodic	cases	of	pleasure	or	satisfaction	—	this	seems	realistic.	But	a	slaveholder	who	actively	engages	in	the	immoral	institution	of	slavery	cannot	
	Nakamura	and	Csikszentmihalyi	(2002)	comments	on	how	difJicult	it	is	“to	sustain	prolonged	involvement	in	26an	endeavor	that	is	experienced	as	signiJicant	if	a	person	does	not	Jind	enjoyment	within	the	activity	itself”	(p.	96).	See	also	Colby	and	Damon	(1992)	and	Ebaugh	(1988)	on	the	likelihood	of	burnout	in	meaningful	yet	unenjoyable	activities.
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enjoy	global	vital	engagement.	Because	of	this	—	as	I’ll	discuss	in	the	next	section	—	they	are	barred	from	what	most	people	would	recognize	as	authentic	happiness. 	27
Part	5:	Morality	&	Happiness		 So	far,	I’ve	presented	an	argument	where	‘being	good’	involves	sustained	and	meaningful	global	Jlow	experiences.	This	experience	is	sustained	by	far-reaching	coherencies	cross-level	(vertical	 coherency)	 which	 is	 sustained	 by	 consistency	 at	 each	 level	 of	 one’s	 moral	 life	(horizontal	coherency).	This	experience	is	global	because	‘being	good’	is	a	disposition	that	is	informed	ultimately	by	the	vertical	coherency	of	the	whole	system	—	it	does	not	reside	at	any	 one	 level	 but	 as	 a	 higher-order	 property	 of	 all	 the	 levels.	 That	 is,	 ‘being	 good’	 is	 a	disposition	 that	 can	manifests	 freely	 and	 sincerely	when	 ‘vertical	 coherency’	 is	 achieved.	The	more	coherency,	the	more	an	agent	can	‘be	good’			 As	implied	in	previous	sections,	‘being	good’	can	also	be	described	as	involving	a	kind	of	‘vital	engagement’.	As	expected,	this	kind	of	‘vital	engagement’	is	global.	It	is	a	relationship	with	the	world	that	is	characterized	both	by	global	Ilow	experiences	(enjoyed	absorption	or	engagement)	and	by	meaning	(at	the	levels	of	one’s	personality	[Levels	1-4]	and	one’s	socio-cultural	context	[Level	5-6])	(Nakamura	&	Csikszentmihalyi,	2002,	p.	87).		 It	will	not	take	much	to	argue	that	this	is	the	kind	of	happiness	that	most	people	mean	if	pushed	on	the	subject	of	‘authentic’	or	‘genuine’	happiness.	At	this	point	of	the	paper,	I	will	argue	 for	 my	 main	 conclusion:	 ‘being	 good’	 positively	 correlates	 to	 ‘being	 happy’.	 ‘Being	good’	 is	a	practical	disposition	 that	demands	 intellectual	and	affective	engagement.	 ‘Being	happy’	is	just	what	I’ve	described	as	global	vital	engagement.	This	is	authentic	happiness.	
	Perhaps	one	can	respond	to	contemporary	cases	similar	to	the	slaveholder	problem	using	my	proposal.	For	27example,	we	could	ask	ourselves	whether	factory	farming	is	allowing	its	active	participant	to	achieve	vertical	coherency.	If	not,	there	may	be	something	inherently	problematic	in	the	institution.	Factory	farming	is	a	less	obvious	case	of	moral	propriety	(compared	to	slavery)	and	so	it	is	supplemented	with	discussions	of	health,	environment,	and	economics.	But	in	terms	of	being	consciously	confronted	with	distributive	injustice	(in	regards	to	the	resources	wasted	in	factory	farming)	and	animal	injustice	(which	demands	more	sensitive,	perhaps	less	universal	capacities	for	empathy),	our	goals,	self-image	and	the	values	we	endorse	as	a	community	may	not	be	as	coherent	as	we	would	like.	Despite	being	agnostic	about	a	speciJic	theory	of	the	good,	the	developmental	picture	presented	in	this	paper	allows	for	new	generations	of	mentors	to	alter	the	‘trajectory’	so-to-speak	of	moral	development.	And	although	I	do	not	suggest	any	robust	conception	of	the	good	(i.e.	the	telos	of	our	‘trajectory’),	my	proposal	insists	that	a	consequence	of	successfully	enacting	the	good	should	be	cognitive	and	social	harmony.
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5.1.	Authentic	happiness		 In	 this	 section,	 I	will	 be	presenting	a	 conception	of	 ‘genuine’	 or	 ‘authentic’	 happiness’	adapted	from	L.W.	Sumner’s	book	Welfare,	Happiness,	and	Ethics	(1996).	I	hope	to	show	that	this	notion	of	happiness	conforms	to	common	sense	and	usage.	I	will	also	show	that	this	is	identical	 to	 the	notion	of	 ‘global	vital	engagement’	 that	 I	previously	argued	was	positively	correlated	with	‘being	good’.	This	will	effectively	show	how	‘being	good’	positively	correlates	to	‘being	happy’.		 Sumner	(1996)	presents	’being	happy’	as	endorsing	and	being	satisJied	with	one’s	life	as	a	whole:	Being	happy	in	this	sense	means	having	a	certain	kind	of	positive	attitude	toward	your	life,	which	in	its	fullest	form	has	both	a	cognitive	and	an	affective	component.	The	cognitive	aspect	of	happiness	consists	in	a	positive	evaluation	of	the	conditions	of	your	life,	a	judgement	that,	at	least	on	balance,	it	measures	up	favourably	against	your	 standards	or	expectations.	This	evaluation	may	be	global,	 covering	all	of	 the	important	sectors	of	your	life,	or	it	may	focus	on	one	particular	(your	work,	say,	or	your	family).	In	either	case	it	represents	an	afJirmation	or	endorsement	of	(some	or	all	of)	the	conditions	or	circumstances	of	your	life,	a	judgement	that,	on	balance	and	taking	everything	into	account,	your	life	is	going	well	for	you.	.	.	The	affective	side	of	happiness	consists	in	what	we	commonly	call	a	sense	of	well-being:	Jinding	your	life	enriching	or	regarding,	or	feeling	satisJied	or	fulJilled	by	it.	(pp.	145-6)	Here,	Sumner	presents	two	dimensions	of	happiness	that	correspond	to	the	intellectual	and	affective	 dimensions	 that	 comprise	 ‘being	 good’.	 In	 order	 to	 cultivate	 one’s	 moral	disposition,	 there	 must	 be	 a	 mindful	 and	 intellectual	 engagement	 with	 one’s	 moral	 life.	Striving	for	cross-level	coherency,	one’s	moral	disposition	and	the	behavior	that	it	generates	allows	 for	 a	more	 “positive	 evaluation”	 of	 one’s	 life.	 That	 is,	 one’s	 behavior	measures	 up	favorably	 against	 the	 recognized	 standards	 at	 each	 level.	 Concurrently,	 there	must	 be	 an	affective	 and	 emotional	 engagement	 with	 one’s	 moral	 life	 in	 order	 to	 synchronize	 one’s	behavior	with	one’s	 feelings	and	 judgments.	This	allows	 for	 the	expression	of	one’s	moral	disposition	more	sincerely	and	spontaneously.	Phenomenologically,	 I	would	insist	that	this	occurs	 as	 an	 enjoyable	 global	 Jlow	 experience.	 The	more	 engagement	 and	 coherency,	 the	more	Jlow.	This	now	exposes	an	important	difference	between	Sumner’s	view	and	my	own.			 Sumner	 is	 articulating	 a	 theory	 that	measures	 ‘authentic	 happiness’	 (what	 he	 sees	 as	comprising	one’s	well-being	or	welfare)	in	terms	of	‘life-satisfaction’.	This	means	that	one’s	happiness	 is	 informed	 by	 the	 positive	 evaluation	 of	 one’s	 life	 and	 the	 occurrent	 sense	 of	“feeling	satisJied”	with	it.	The	proposed	view	of	happiness	that	I’ve	articulated	in	this	paper	
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involves	these	intellectual	and	affective	dimensions	but	also	a	degree	of	engagement	in	these	dimensions	 that	 Sumner	does	not	 acknowledge.	Using	 the	 skill	 analogy,	 I	believe	 that	 I’ve	shown	that	including	Jlow	experience	in	a	discussion	of	moral	expertise	is	justiJied.			 Additionally,	I	believe	that	emphasizing	felt	engagement	or	absorption	in	one’s	moral	life	goes	a	long	way	towards	discouraging	a	charge	of	a	kind	of	intellectualism	that	comes	with	Sumner’s	 ‘life-satisfaction’	view	of	happiness.	When	taken	out	of	 Jlow	(that	 is,	when	taken	out	 of	 the	 actual	 activity	 which	 one	 Jinds	 inherently	 enjoyable),	 it’s	 likely	 that	 the	 agent	would	 provide	 a	 positive	 evaluation	 of	 one’s	 experience.	 But	 this	 evaluation	 would	 be	
retrospective	and	external	to	the	experience	which	is	being	evaluated.	The	actual	instance	of	happiness	 is	 immanent	—	 in	 the	 experience	 itself.	 Thus,	 it’s	 more	 helpful	 to	 talk	 about	happiness	as	comprising	of	a	global	Jlow	experience	and	a	sense	of	meaning,	both	of	which	is	 the	 result	 of	 achieving	 (through	 intellectual	 and	 affective	 engagement)	 the	 vertical	coherency	described	in	this	paper.		 The	resulting	view	shows	‘authentic	happiness’	as	a	global	kind	of	‘vital	engagement’.	As	Nakamura	&	Csikszentmihalyi	(2002)	say,	“the	optimal	outcome	of	human	development	is	a	life	characterized	by	the	conjunction	of	enjoyment	and	meaning	in	one’s	endeavors”	(p.	94).	Global	 ‘vital	 engagement’	 entails	 both	 enjoyment	 and	 meaning	 which	 emerges	 from	 the	sustained	 ‘vertical	 coherency’	 found	 in	 the	 practical	 disposition	 of	 a	 morally	 developed	agent.		 Angela	 is	 authentically	happy	because	of	 the	vital	 engagement	 she	 Jinds	 in	diplomacy.	Unscrupulous	is	deprived	of	authentic	happiness	despite	experiencing	legitimate	moments	of	‘feeling	happy.’	To	clarify	why	this	doesn’t	matter	much	to	the	kind	of	happiness	that	we	care	about,	I	will	brieJly	present	what	‘being	happy’	is	not.	
5.2.	What	‘being	happy’	is	not		 ‘Being	happy’	is	not	‘being	happy	with’	or	‘about’	something.	The	way	that	this	phrase	is	commonly	 used,	 ‘being	happy	with’	 amounts	 to	merely	 being	 satisJied	with	 something	—	having	a	positive	attitude	towards	it	or	expressing	a	positive	evaluation	of	it.	Sumner	rightly	notes	that	“no	affect	or	occurrent	feeling	on	your	part	is	implied”	when	we	say	we	are	happy	with	something	(p.	143).	This	kind	of	happiness	 is	potentially	absent	of	any	enjoyment	or	felt	meaning.	It	is	not	the	kind	of	happiness	that	we	pursue	for	ourselves	and	our	loved	ones.	
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	 ‘Being	 happy’	 is	 not	 ‘feeling	 happy’.	 This	 kind	 of	 happiness	 involves	 the	 affective	dimension	that	 ‘being	happy	with’	was	 lacking.	 It	 is	certainly	desirable	(this	 is	 the	kind	of	happiness	that	hedonism	pursues)	but	—	as	Sumner	notes	—	“feelings	of	happiness	.	.	.	are	frames	of	mind	subject	to	Jluctuation	from	day	to	day,	rather	than	settled	judgements	about	the		quality	of	our	lives”	(p.	145).	By	itself,	it	lacks	the	intellectual	dimension	which	is	meant	to	guide	our	pursuits	appropriately	towards	things	that	give	us	more	stable	and	meaningful	experiences	of	enjoyment.	‘Feeling	happy’	is	certainly	good	but	it	is	not	what	we	should	aim	for.	Authentic	happiness	should	allow	for	richer	and	more	consistent	experiences	of	‘feeling	happy’	but	it	provides	much	more	that	episodic	pleasure.		 ‘Being	 happy’	 is	 not	 ‘having	 a	 happy	 disposition’.	 This	 is	 “a	 settled	 tendency”	 toward	occurrent	episodes	of	feeling	happy	(p.	145).	This	is	getting	closer	to	the	kind	of	authentic	happiness	that	we	care	about	for	ourselves	and	our	loved	ones.	But	it	still	seems	unrealistic	without	 it	being	guided	by	an	 intellectual	engagement	with	one’s	 life	as	a	whole.	 In	other	words,	although	I	agree	that	this	kind	of	happiness	would	be	close	to	the	kind	of	happiness	we	care	about,	I	don’t	think	it’s	realistic	to	aim	towards	having	a	happy	disposition	without	engaging	with	 one’s	 life	 as	 a	whole	 and	how	 it	 ‘hangs	 together’	 in	 the	way	 that	 I’ve	 been	discussing	 in	 this	 paper.	 ‘Being	 happy’	 should	 not	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 just	 increasing	 the	amount	 one	 ‘feels	 happy’	 —	 this	 is	 ancillary	 or	 even	 incidental	 to	 authentic	 happiness.	‘Being	happy’	 is	about	ensuring	 that	your	 life	 is	not	only	enjoyable	and	engaging,	but	also	and	meaningful.	
5.3.	Conclusion	to	Part	5		 In	 conclusion,	 ‘being	happy’	 is	 the	 conjunction	of	enjoyment	and	meaning	 that	 results	from	 developing	 moral	 goodness	 as	 a	 skill	 and	 achieving	 the	 vertical	 coherency	characterized	 in	 Part	 4	 of	 this	 paper.	 ‘Being	 good’	 is	 a	 practical	 disposition	 that	 entails	intellectual	 and	 affective	 engagement	 with	 one’s	 world,	 resolving	 inconsistencies	 and	aligning	the	values	that	one	hold	at	a	personal	and	socio-cultural	 level.	To	the	degree	that	this	coherency	is	achieved,	one	becomes	more	‘good’	in	a	real	and	sincere	way.	Likewise,	to	the	degree	that	this	coherency	is	achieved,	the	more	one	enjoys	a	global	Jlow	experience	and	the	more	meaning	is	granted	to	one’s	life.	These	two	elements	characterize	the	kind	of	‘vital	engagement’	 that	we	 can	 appropriately	 deem	 ‘authentic	 happiness’.	 This	 is	 the	 happiness	that	we	hope	for	ourselves	and	those	we	care	about.	If	one	pursues	this	kind	of	happiness	
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without	 also	 seeking	 to	 be	 good	 —	 without	 seeking	 vertical	 coherency	 —	 whatever	happiness	 that	 is	 procured	 will	 be	 unstable	 and	 easily	 spoiled.	 ‘Authentic	 happiness’	 is	stable	happiness.	It	is	an	achievement	that	a	sincerely	good	person	enjoys	after	a	thoughtful	and	careful	engagement	with	her	world,	her	community,	and	herself.		
Part	6:	Concluding	Thoughts	—	Happiness	as	achievement		 ‘Being	 good’	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 global	 skill	 directed	 towards	 shaping	 and	 fashioning	 one’s	practical	dispositions.	The	goal	is	to	better	express	this	disposition.	The	only	way	to	do	this	is	 by	 deliberately	 and	 gradually	 bringing	 all	 the	 activities	 of	 one’s	 life	 into	 alignment.	Exercising	 this	 global	 skill	 is	 inherently	 enjoyable	 and	meaningful.	 I	 think	 it’s	 fair	 at	 this	point	to	characterize	the	happiness	that	one	Jinds	in	this	process	as	—	more	than	anything	—	 an	 achievement.	 Doing	 so	 will	 drive-home	 the	 point	 that	 my	 proposal	 conforms	 to	common	sense	notions	of	happiness.			 Julia	 Annas	 in	 her	 article	 “Happiness	 as	 Achievement”	 (2004)	 conveys	 the	 sentiment	nicely	 —	 making	 the	 distinction	 between	 ‘feeling	 happy’	 as	 a	 result	 of	 “doing	 any	 old	thing”	(p.	45)	and	actually	‘being	happy’	and	living	a	happy	life:	Getting	a	smiley-face	feeling	from	good	deeds	or	bad	deeds	lasts	only	as	long	as	the	deeds	do.	And	this	kind	of	happiness	does	not	matter	 to	us	all	 that	much	once	we	start	to	think	in	a	serious	way	about	our	lives.	As	we	bring	up	our	children,	what	we	aim	for	is	not	that	they	have	episodes	of	smiley-face	feelings,	but	that	their	lives	go	well	as	wholes:	we	come	to	think	of	happiness	as	the	way	a	life	as	a	whole	goes	well,	and	see	that	episodes	of	happiness	are	not	what	we	build	our	lives	around	(p.	45)	.	.	.	Even	if	episodes	Jirst	come	to	mind,	we	do	think,	centrally,	of	living	happy	lives.	And	this	is	because	we	think	of	our	lives	as	wholes	when	we	are	thinking	of	how	to	live,	what	kind	of	people	we	are	to	aspire	to	be.	(p.	46)	We	have	the	thought	that	happiness	comes	from	living	in	some	ways	and	not	others,	that	it	 is	not	something	that	others	can’t	given	you,	either	by	giving	you	stuff	or	by	getting	you	into	a	particular	state.	(p.	50)		 	I	have	argued	that	the	kind	of	happiness	that	we	truly	want	for	ourselves	and	those	we	care	about	comes	from	not	just	doing	good	things	but	being	good	people.	 	This	can	be	perceived	as	 difJicult	 at	 Jirst	 (and	 rightly	 so)	 but	 as	we	 gradually	 train	 ourselves	 and	 keep	 striving	towards	 being	 better,	 such	 moral	 cultivation	 will	 not	 only	 become	 easier,	 it	 will	 become	more	enjoyable	and	undergird	an	enriching	and	sustainable	happiness.	Now	we	can	see	this	project	as	a	worthy	endeavor	not	 just	 for	morality’s	sake	but	 for	our	own	happiness.	This	
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makes	 us	willing	 participants	 in	 this	 challenge,	 allows	 us	 to	 take	 pride	 in	 our	 success	 at	being	good	people,	and	allows	us	to	take	satisfaction	from	our	well-earned	achievement	that	is	true	happiness.	 	28
		The	line	of	Sanskrit	in	my	acknowledgments	page	(p.	v)	is	an	Indian	proverb	presented	as	entry	26	in	Bhate,	S.	28(Ed.).	(1987).	Subhāṣita-śatakam	[One	Hundred	Good	Sayings]	(Vol.	2).	Pune:	University	of	Poona.	My	own	translation	is	as	follows:	“As	the	thought,	so	the	word;	as	the	word,	so	the	deed.	Among	good	men,	there	is	a	uniformity	in	thought,	word,	and	deed.”	This	rang	true	to	me	when	I	Jirst	read	it	and	served	as	an	impetus	for	writing	this	paper.	The	sincerely	good	person	would	have	no	tension	between	her	thoughts	and	actions	(including	her	speech	acts).	Once	we’ve	appropriately	cultivated	ourselves	morally,	the	beneJicial	consequences	surely	include	a	free	and	enjoyable	relationship	with	our	surroundings	and	with	each	other.
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